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ABSTRACT

A Lacanian Perspective on Literature,
Translation and the Reader’s (Inter-)Subjectivity:
Read My Text and Tell Me Who You Are

by

CHENG On Yee Franziska

Master of Philosophy

My purpose in this research is to raise some theoretical issues in the study of
literature and translation. One dominating attribute of a piece of literary text is its
poetic linguistic features, e.g. ambiguity, irony, contradictions and linguistic tension.
However, these traits of literary texts are theorized by Julia Kristeva as the
manifestation of the drive’s dismantling of what Jacques Lacan characterizes as the
Symbolic, hence an almost schizophrenic collection of disruptions of the relation
between the signifiers and the signifieds. I intend to push this argument further into
the realm of translation, arguing that even though it is impossible to achieve an
equivalent translatum, it is possible to contain most of the meanings, or even
plausible to create extra layers of meanings to the text through rendering the target
text with the application of theories and the utilization of homophones.
This exploratory thesis takes Translation as its broad topic. More specifically, I am
interested in the theory of translation, as well as the practice, as it applies to
‘transgressive’ texts in English being translated into Chinese (as language and
culture), Jeanette Winterson as a case-study example. In the body of this paper, I
provide an experimental translation of the first few complex sentences of the
beginning of the first Sappho chapter in Art & Lies (2005), which demonstrates how
the application of Lacanian psychoanalysis may help in the interpretation as well as
translation of complicated literary texts. The target text would, ideally, preserve
multiple layers of meanings and can be read in some other meaningful way after the
application of interdisciplinary theories. In this dissertation, I embrace a heuristic
rather than a correctness-based approach to translation which focuses on the
explorations of various possible creative multileveled translations. I do not attempt to
translate Winterson according to traditional translation norms, and do not attempt to
apply Lacanian theory to translation in a rigid and dogmatic way. In other words, the
production of the best, or even a defensible way to translate, is not my purpose of
translation and hence is not any underlying premise of the birth of this thesis.
Moreover, in this dissertation I investigate the nature of reader’s intersubjectivity in
reading, as neither writing nor translation may be separated from the reading activity.
As for intersubjectivity, I refer to the subjectivity of the reader which is dominated

by Other, for sub-ject is a person who is controlled and voiced over. The two
prevalent manifestations of the Other in reading is the Other as Author-God and the
Other as Text. It is the reader’s intersubjectivity (rather than simply subjectivity)
because these Others do not exist ontologically but only “survive” as an unconscious
force in our mutual consciousness, something similar to a shared belief, a collective
phenomenon. By discussing and comparing the two Others, the Other as the AuthorGod and the Other as Text, I demonstrate how these two seemingly contradictory
Others do not bring about dramatic differences in the two subjectivities.

DECLARATION

I declare that this is an original work based primarily on my own research,
and I warrant that all citations of previous research, published or unpublished, have
been duly acknowledged.

_____________________________________
(Cheng On Yee, Franziska)
1st August 2012

CONTENTS
Acknowledgments

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii

1.1 Translation and the Nature of It -------------------------------------------------

1

1.2 Jeanette Winterson and Chinese Translation

10

1. Introduction

-------------------------------

1.3 Jeanette Winterson and Lacanian Psychoanalysis

-----------------------

2. The Author-God and the Text as the Other on Reading (Inter-)Subjectivity

16

-----

23

-------------------------------------------------------------------

40

3. The Compulsion to Repeat and Sacrifice: Jeanette Winterson and Atlas
3.1 Transgression

3.2 Repetition, the Beginning and the (Excess) Void in Limitation

-----

49

4. The Hegemony of Language, the Void and the Forbidden Fruit: Objet a, the big
Other and Repetition
4.1 The end-stop

-------------------------------------------------------------------

57

4.2 Of the universe

-------------------------------------------------------------------

65

4.3 In flagrante delicto
4.4 I am a sexualist

----------------------------------------------------------

74

-------------------------------------------------------------------

87

5. The Restriction of Language and the Alienation of the (Divided) Subject: Proper
Names and Sexuation
5.1 Proper Names, Naming and Translation: Restriction and Rebellion
5.2 Gender and Sexuation: The Empty Signifier
5.3 性明

-----

-------------------------------

93
100

--------------------------------------------------

--------------------

103

6. Conclusion

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

106

7. Bibliography

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

112

i

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my chief supervisor Prof.
Douglas Robinson, who agreed to take charge of my thesis in the first month that he
joined the Lingnan English Department. During the course of study, Prof. Robinson
has given me a huge amount of academic and emotional support which I cherish very
much. As my research topic is highly interdisciplinary, Prof. Robinson’s extensive
knowledge in many fields has benefited me a lot. Moreover, he gave me a great
degree of valuable academic freedom which is significant when it comes to such an
original topic. I have investigated a good number of ideas in these two years and
finally rejected a lot of them, which includes Daoism, Lady Gaga’s lyrics and one of
the Four Great Classical Novels of Chinese Literature, The Dream of the Red
Mansion, since it is impossible to contain too many diverse complex ideas in an
M.Phil thesis. I hope that I may carry these elements to my Ph.D thesis, so that our
effort would not have been wasted. I am grateful that Prof. Robinson gave me a lot of
time to attempt new research directions, and he has never been unsupportive even if
some ideas turned out not very suitable to my research topic. If he had not kept
encouraging me to try new things, I would probably have stuck with my proposed
topic two years ago, which would be a much less challenging but at the same time
much less interesting comparative reading of Winterson’s source texts and the
existing Chinese translations. Also, I am extremely thankful for Prof. Robinson’s
emphasis on a concrete time-schedule, which helped very much in producing a thesis
of this scale. Moreover, it is with Prof. Robinson’s constant encouragement and
guidance that I learnt to sweep away my anxiety over my topic as well as any

ii

possible distractions; without Prof. Robinson’s academic and emotional support, this
M.Phil thesis would never have been produced.
I am also extremely grateful to Prof. Ersu Ding, who has been providing
enthusiastic support and crucial academic freedom in this period. Prof. Ding has been
very kind to me as his tutor in that he always put my dissertation in the first priority
when he allocates work for me (mentoring undergraduate classes), which has given
me a lot of free time to read and think. Without Prof. Ding’s very caring
consideration, I again would never have been able to have taken so many attempts on
diverse interdisciplinary research directions.
Here, I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the dedicated
professors in the Lingnan English Department. To start with I am extremely grateful
to Prof. Barry Asker, my Final Year Project supervisor, who has always been very
supportive since I was a 2nd year undergraduate student. Without Prof. Asker’s
constant kind reassurance in my academic potential, I would probably not have
progressed into an academic career and hence my FYP, my conference paper and this
M.Phil dissertation would not have been produced. His continuous support is, again,
vital in my insistence of writing this thesis. My appreciation also goes to Dr. Mike
Ingham for his emphasis on the importance of writing and risk-taking, as these are
two of the most essential elements for the development of my thesis.
Apart from my teachers in Lingnan, my gratitude also goes to Dr. Gray Kane,
an Lacanian expert whom I have never met in person but helped me understand
Lacanian psychoanalysis through our contact in emails and Facebook. Your very
kind consultation is, again, crucial to the production of this thesis.
Finally, this work would not be possible if not for the support of my family. I
would like to thank my parents for supporting the family financially and, at the same
time, supporting me mentally, while I was working on Lacanian psychoanalysis and
iii

reader’s subjectivity. Also, I would like to thank my pug Chocolate for allowing me
to wake him up and hug him in the middle of the night when I am stressed, confused
and upset.

iv

1. Introduction

1.1

Translation and its Nature

Translation, the rendering of a text from its source to its target language, is a
difficult and demanding task. It requires the translator to possess not only an
excellent mastery of linguistic skills and the cultural connotations of both languages,
but also an exquisite sensitivity and awareness to subtle cultural differences. An
episode which occurred to an acquaintance of mine at a sister institution in Hong
Kong recently has caught my mind while I’ve been considering the nature of
translation. Studying for a Master of Arts in Translation at a university with a good
reputation in Hong Kong, my colleague, a mainlander who is native in Mandarin
Chinese, submitted an assignment which required her to translate a literary text from
English into her Chinese. As is well known, literary translation is an especially
difficult activity demanding a range of skills and knowledge. When the graded paper
was returned from her teacher, she noticed a comment which she perceived as a very
serious criticism. The teacher’s remark which traumatized her confidence was a
deceptively simple remark: ‘你的中文太歐化！(Your Chinese is too European!)’.
Shocked and depressed as she was, my colleague attempted to understand
what was meant by this comment. If she had been told that her English was
inadequate, she would have understood immediately, as a second language can
always stand improvement. If particular lines of translation had been marked as
either wrong or in some way inadequate, again she would have known what to do
about it. But to be told that her Chinese is too European is harder to grasp. She
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figured that probably the teacher was commenting on aspects of her translation that
had more to do with implicit cultural emphases that showed her own points of view,
points that stood in some kind of ideological or cultural contrast to those of her
teacher. In other words, the way she sees the world, perhaps also politically, as this is
reflected linguistically in her translation, is somehow ‘wrong’. It also occurred to her
that her teacher was himself unaware of his hidden ideological assumptions, though
the traditional Chinese context and the status of the teacher as authority meant that
she could not say this to him.
This anecdote spoke to me powerfully in two senses: the first is that a
translatum may never be separated from a translator’s background; the second is that
no interpretation of any text may be separated from the reader. I will go into the first
one here, and then the second one. As for the relation between translator and
translatum, it is both arrogant and ignorant to aver that a translator’s subjectivity
does not enter into the process of translation, for it is definite that a translator’s
cultural, political, religious, educational as well as family background will influence
the way that s/he perceives and re-presents the texts.
Undoubtedly, if we are to consider not only the field of Translation Studies
but most societies, there is a mainstream celebration of what Douglas Robinson calls
a “metempsychotic translation” (63), which can be partly traced back to the
translation of the Bible. The term “metempsychosis” refers to the ancient Greek
notion of the transmigration of souls from one body (through death) to another; the
concept of metempsychotic translation was first introduced in Translation & Taboo
(1996), using metempsychosis as a metaphor for the traditional ideal for translation,
in which the meaning as the disembodied soul of a text is removed from the “dead
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body” of the source text and reincarnated in the body of the target text, without
change.
The counternormative approach to translation that I propose to explore
heuristically here begins with the perception that metempsychotic translation—the
dominant ideology of translation as a subordinate, secondary copy of the original, the
more loyal the better—is overtly patriarchal and masculine, especially if we take
masculinity to signify a defining, positing way of interpreting and classifying the
world.
Although deviations from the normative “metempsychotic” approach to
translation are often denounced by non-specialists, discussions of and propositions
for such counternormative approaches by contemporary academics in Translation
Studies are not rare. In her essay ‘Gender and the Metaphorics of Translation’
(1988), for example, Lori Chamberlain attempted to highlight the patriarchal nature
of the metempsychotically “ideal” translation, which is, like the superiority of males
to females, ideologically “normal” to our societies. As defined by traditional Western
culture, translation is an “archetypally feminine activity” which is “reproductive”
and “derivative”, “at best an echo”. If the translation in any way “deviates” from the
source text, it is then considered “artificial, false, and treasonous” (57-58).

When it

comes to the subject matter of translation, most people “naturally” (unconsciously)
consider metempsychotic translation “normal” and “proper”—particularly those who
were raised in the Western nations where Christianity is prevalent, as well as cultures
influenced by European colonization. Lacan has elaborated the term “nor-mal” as the
norm of males, which coincides with Chamberlain’s application of gender politics in
translation studies. And the very interesting term “proper” is remarkably similar to
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the word “property”—and indeed the relation between the two is patent in patriarchal
societies.
I would therefore like to consider the investigation of the subject matter of
translation as something more than a listing of “right” principles of translation, let
alone analysis of any specific translatum or translating experience per se. The nature
and the activity of translation carry a heavy connotation of gender, which is one
reason why Lacan, with his teaching of the phallus as the empty signifier of loss
(symbolic stopping point) and Winterson, as a controversial feminist novelist, have
come into place. And, when it comes to the subject matter of translation,
psychoanalysis is an important tool for our study since the production and
interpretation of translation can never be separated from human subjectivity. Our
mind constructs and restricts our perception and interpretation of the text, as well as
everything “outside”, which is why I have reserved Chapter 2 for the discussion of
reading (inter-)subjectivity. Here, I have especially put down quotation marks on the
term “outside”, because the idea of “outside-ness” and otherness is much more
complicated than they superficially see. Can we, and how can we, perceive anything
“outside”, if every image and idea that we perceive must go through our senses and
mind?
“Deviant” translation is, similar to adultery, a taboo. Like many other taboos,
this ban on unfaithful translation in some English-speaking countries can be traced
back to the long history of the rise of European Christianity, in its linguistic and
translated aspect, and the defense of the translated fiction of the Septuagint and other
stories. As noted by Douglas Robinson in Translation & Taboo, the church repressed
the critical thinking of both the translators and the masses by categorizing those who
realized or spoke of the differences among translations as heretics and then enforced
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punishment for deviation, which “[g]radually build the fear of excommunication,
execution, eternity in hell into the normative (and eventually universal) structure or
‘principle’ of ‘translation’, so that, when Christian civilization becomes ‘civilized’
enough not to burn ‘bad’ or deviant translators at the stake, no one will want to
deviate any longer” (68-9). In other words, the early church took a hard line on what
was acceptable or not in translations of biblical texts and punished those who
challenged its authority, and by doing so it created an orthodoxy which plays a
significant role in the evolution of translation theories in Europe.
If we are to look carefully into the premises, any premises, or requirements of
a “good” translation, it is not difficult to see that all of them are taught, i.e. they can
never come to us in nature, for there is no such thing as nature without a culture. As
Jacques Lacan has commented in Seminar XX, the most crucial and arguably the
only thing that God did in Genesis is to name things.

Genesis recounts nothing other than the creation, from nothing, in
effect—of what?—of nothing but signifiers. As soon as this creation
emerges, it is articulated on the basis of the naming of what is. Isn’t that
creation in its essence? While Aristotle cannot help but enunciate that, if
ever there was anything it had always been there, isn’t what is at stake in
creationism a creation on the basis of nothing—thus on the basis of
signifier? (41)

The way that we signify and categorize the world shapes our perception of it,
and this is what Lacan means by articulating that “reality is approached with
apparatuses of jouissance” and “there’s no other apparatus than language” (Seminar
XX 55). Reality is, to Lacan, propped up by fantasy, for our common everyday
reality is an illusion that rests on the repression and overlooking of the real of our
(illicit) desire. Social reality is, as Slavoj Žižek comments in Looking Awry (1991),
“nothing but a fragile, Symbolic cobweb that can at any moment be torn aside by an
5

intrusion of the real” (17). Lacan has explained in Seminar XVII that “the coefficient
of fabrication” perpetuates in our sensation of reality that the reality is constructed by
our perception of it and this perception per se is an anamorphosis. This is why we
may never know the thing-in-itself. As John Locke has put it in one simple sentence,
“Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu (Nothing is in the understanding
that was not previously in the senses)”. However, we, as subjects, are unaware of the
construction, especially when it is a well-believed one, as we usually internalize and
rationalize the majority’s standard as the better, the best, and eventually the universal
law of a certain existence. In Translation & Taboo, Robinson has demonstrated the
psyche of a “normal” translator (who is voiced over by the normative ideology of
metempsychotic translation) and the archetypical three-step processes of
rationalization: Repression, Denial, and at last Rationalization. The social and
religious institute (i.e. the Church) celebrates metempsychotic translation and sets up
restrictive norms to repress alternatives, first by direct punishment such as execution
and excommunication, and later on by the mystification of counter-normative ideas
as “irrational”, “not-worth-considering” or even “non-existent”. After the continuous
process of repression and denial, not only the Church but also the people, who were
long taught to repress and deny, rationalize the preferable premises (metempsychotic
translation) as the “right” and inevitable way to translate.
However, regardless of the constant, enthusiastic denial and denunciation of
the existence of translators’ subjectivity, which was and still is a common
phenomenon among not only laymen but also translators, it is important to bear in
mind that translator’s subjectivity has never been, or more precisely, cannot be
totally rejected in the mainstream. Not only because it is, from the “normal” negative
belief, the residue which will always haunt us as human translators but also because
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human subjectivity and participation lie in the essence of metempsychotic
translation. In Robinson’s Who Translates (1990), he presented a sophisticated
argument (through the investigation of spirit-channeling in ancient times) on the
undeniable existence of translators’ subjectivities beyond reason in target text:

[…] spirit-channels are never perfectly passive. Spirit-channels
contribute to the channeling process too. Channeling in the spiritualist
literature is much more of a meeting of minds than it is the total
possession of a living body by a discarnate mind. As spirit-channels
describe themselves, they are never the mere helpless instruments of the
discarnate spirits; they are often highly active, engaged in interpreting the
sights and sounds and feelings sent to and through them from what they
describe as the spirit world. So far from being passive invisible conduits,
in fact, spirit-channels in many cultures have even feared and revered as
shamans, priests, even as gods and goddesses. (16)

Through a vivid explanation of the nature of spirit-channeling, Robinson
argues that entirely passive translator has never existed even back in the ancient time,
when Christians believed in the theory propagated by Philo Judaeus, the Christian
myth of the 72 divinely inspired translators of the Hebrew Bible at Alexandria (the
Septuagint). These translators, Robinson suggested, have never been thought of as
“passive conduits or vessels”, surprisingly contradictory to the dominating belief,
sprung from this myth, that translators are empty machines of function other than
passing the soul (meaning) of a text from one body (language) to the other.
Translators are, according to the Christian legend, the origin of metempsychotic
translation, respected mediums whose subjectivity cannot and should not be denied
or neglected.
This dissertation is not only a paper on translation, or the application of
psychoanalysis on English-Chinese translation; it is, simultaneously, a thesis on
literature. I attempt to investigate and understand literature through translation, by
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looking into other significant layers of meanings in a text through the interpretation
of its translatum. After Blanchot and Derrida the elitist cosmopolitan notion that
deeper understanding of texts moves, and moves only, through translation has
become

a

popular,

nonetheless

controversial

notion.

Regardless

of

the

disappointment and anger stemming from monolinguals and “pure” (English)
literature scholars, it is nevertheless undeniable that translation can teach us
something about literature as elite complex writings, and as a “sub-product” of
cultural and political systems. If we are to consider the nature of translation, it is, to
simplify, an exercise of reading and rewriting. Rewriting texts, i.e. expressing a
certain central idea (soul) with diverse signifiers (body), or the failure of it, is, by
nature, an act of interrogating the texts—an inevitable transgression: to (re)produce a
translation is to push the source text beyond the otherness of language and culture.
Think about the eternal futility of taming a foreign text: it is impossible to tame any
exotic writing perfectly because, to start with, there is an otherness which cannot be
completely internalized. Despite the famous saying from Shakespeare according to
which “that which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet”, we must
not forget that languages do shape the way we categorize and interpret things. A very
simple example is the term 人中, literally “human-centre”, which is exclusively
generated to refer to the medial cleft extended from the nose to the upper lip (ending
at the cupid’s bow) on human beings. This concept of 人中 is significant to the
Chinese culture, for it plays a very important role in Chines face reading. The depth
and length of a 人中 is believed to foretell the number of children by implying the
ease of fertility, which was crucial, especially to women, in ancient times.
Although we have the word “philtrum” in English, it was not specifically created to
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refer to human beings: there is a “dog philtrum” and a “cat philtrum”, and to refer to
humans we will have to add the term “human” before “philtrum”.
Lacking of a special signifier for the “human philtrum” does not mean
English-speakers cannot observe the cleft between the nose and the upper lip.
Provided that their visual ability is intact, people who speak different languages
should share the same vision when they observe the same object—it is total nonsense
to suspect that English natives could not see the nasal cleft because they do not have
a term similar to 人中, just as the fact that there are no suffix-implied tenses in
Chinese does not mean that Chinese cannot tell the difference between day and night,
or cannot articulate them. However, what I attempt to argue from the example of 人
中 is that, when English-speakers look at a face, it is relatively less likely for them
to focus on the depth or length of the cleft, for that part of the body does not signify
anything significant to them.
Here, if we try to recall how Lacan interprets the relation between language
and reality, we find the issue more complicated. As Lacan believes that language is
the condition of the unconscious, the way that language works and how it constructs
images or ideas will enormously influence how our unconscious works. The slip of
tongue, for instance, of 人 中 as the implication of a woman’s anxiety over
infertility could occur exclusively in Chinese, while this complex concept would be
impossible to transfer into simple English without the detailed explanation of the
Chinese cultural background and the patent patriarchal structure in ancient times. As
a result, there is something more than the superficial meanings of a linguistic term
which could be translated directly and equivalently, which is the otherness of a
source/target language.
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During the process of translation, one may gradually get used to the solution
of dealing with this otherness, yet no one can perfectly engulf the otherness in
language and culture and turn it into anything completely belonging to the “self”,
simply because it does not stem from and is not contained in the source language and
culture. This otherness is always in-between and elusively ambiguous. It restlessly
resists symbolization, while simultaneously representing both and none. If translation
can achieve any function more than promoting and spreading a text to our foreign
reader, it would certainly be providing one crucial layer of literary interpretation, a
layer which is both excessive and deficient. And isn’t it the case that the metaphors
in the two etymologies of “translation” and “transgression” are similar (“carrying
across” and “stepping across”)?

1.2

Jeanette Winterson and Chinese translation

In this paper I take Jeanette Winterson as a case-study example, so as to raise
the attention of translation as a means to understand not only her writing but also any
other complex literary texts. And let me state categorically here at the outset that my
primary focus is on translation, and specifically a heuristic and transgressive
exploration of the possibilities of translation for the understanding of literature, and
specifically of literature as an expression of the human psyche. This is not literary
criticism: I am not interested in offering a comprehensive interpretation of Jeanette
Winterson. Nor is it traditional translation criticism, either of existing Chinese
translations of her novels (though I will do a little of that in passing), or of my own,
in the ancient mode of “this is why I translated the text as I did.” I am not at all
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interested in establishing, or even interrogating, “the right way to translate.” Nor, for
that matter, is it traditional translation theory, in the sense of attempting to establish
what translation is. What I do here is primarily Lacanian literary theory, using
Lacan’s thought about language and the psyche to explore literature in the crosscultural flows opened up by translation.
Winterson’s novels, starting from Oranges Are Not The Only Fruit in 1985,
have always been complicated and challenging for not only common readers but also
literary scholars to interpret. Her application of vocabulary, grammar and story
structure is constantly elusive and ambiguous, which creates difficulty in
understanding the texts in a traditional, linear way, and hence also in translating
them.
Although it has long been recognized that absolute equivalence is
unattainable in translation, Winterson’s novels resist translation in a much higher
degree than most literary texts because her writing is so complexly saturated in the
linguistic usage of the English language and the cultural background, especially the
Christian and other myths, of the European countries. However, we cannot deny the
fact that translating Winterson is an effective exercise in reading her, as it gives us an
opportunity to contemplate her writing extremely carefully. Moreover, translation
may help us learn more about literature as literature, precisely because it is so
difficult.
In order to demonstrate how the complexity of literary texts may have an
impact on translation, I would like to raise two interesting examples from
Winterson’s writings: the first one is the term “the Word” in Art & Lies, a twohundred-page novel published eighteen years ago but never translated into either
simplified or traditional Chinese. The second one is an overt addition in the content
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of the simplified Chinese translation of Weight (2005), which is a patently obvious
ideological

smuggling,

uncommon

and

“perverted”

for

the

traditional

metempsychotic translation.
The first example “the Word” demonstrates how religious implications
determine the perception of the same piece of text by two different ethnic and
cultural groups. Raised by a pair of zealously religious Evangelist adoptive parents,
Winterson has been familiar with biblical verses and stories since childhood. Her
intimate connection with Christianity is profoundly reflected by her frequent
invocation of biblical connotations in her writing.
In the first Sappho section of Art & Lies, Winterson quotes and comments on
the concept of “the Word” (54-5), which originates from John 1:1 in the New
Testament: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the
Word was God.” In the Chinese translation of the Bible, the same verse is rendered:
“太初有道，道与神同在，道就是神。” The Word is translated as 道 in Chinese,
which is Dao. Dao in Chinese is “the way”, which as a result refers coincidently to
another verse in the New Testament, John 14:6, “Jesus answered, ‘I am the way and
the truth and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me”. And, more
significantly, the character Dao is, for the Chinese reader, the same Dao in Daoism.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to deeply investigate the nature of Dao
and its relation to languages as well as the Lacanian subject, so I would reserve a
critical discussion about these issues to another occasion. Here, I highlight the
translational problem of the Word and Dao in order not only to emphasize the
difficulty in translating Winterson but also to raise an important dilemma in literary
translation. It is more than the old-school argument over whether the translator
should give priority to the source text or the target reader, to the literal content or the
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implicit cultural references—no matter whether a translator goes for a literal or a
cultural translation, the translation will inevitably mock both the writer and the
rewriter.
If the translator favors a literal translation, the Christian connotation is lost;
on the other hand, if the translator preserves the biblical connotation, its reference is
still lost because the target culture modifies the cultural connotation. Christianity in
Winterson’s work is replaced by Daoism in most Chinese readers’ minds, without
any single hesitation, because we as Chinese are all raised by the culture in which
Dao has everything to do with Daoism rather than Christianity. This example
supports what I suggested in the introduction, that the production of meaning, i.e. the
interpretation of text, depends far more on the reader than on the writer, and hence
what “you” reads from my text tells me who you are but never who I am (provided
that I am the writer).
For Winterson’s English reader, the Word carries a biblical connotation; but
for her Chinese audience, Dao would carry a Daoist connotation, which is arguably a
more suitable translation of the Logos (Λόγος), “the Word” in Greek, since Dao in
Daoism carries the meaning of a mystical, powerful entity. Although it is arguable
whether the translation of Christianity into Daoism is much more justifiable than it
superficially seems, for both are powerful and well-established religions in the two
cultures, still we must not overlook the fundamental differences between the two
religions: the most patent one, drawing the contextualization with Winterson’s
works, is their attitude towards sex. The Christian church takes a prudish stance and
condemns sex as the original sin, for which we deserve to be burnt for eternity to
redeem. However, Daoism suggests that sex is a necessary part of life because it
believes in the harmony between yin and yang. Achieving this harmony through
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sexual intercourse (especially when the woman is pleasured and ejaculation is
withheld) would, according to the teaching of the Daoism sexual practices—“the
bedroom arts”—keep people in good health and help them attain longevity.
Based on this foundational difference between the Christian and the Daoist
stances on sex, we could imagine how diverse the meanings of the English source
text and the Chinese translation would be, when the Word and 道 appear in a novel
with some certain variety of sexual practices, including homosexuality, incest and
castration. This example speaks vividly to us on how the death of some cultural
references is determined by numerous factors outside the texts, such as a society’s
religious, cultural and political background, which has pretty much shown us why
the search for an equivalent translation of literary texts is always a futile quest.
Instead of seeking a way to achieve an equivalent translation, the metempsychotic
translation, the “correct” translation, we should produce interesting translations,
complex translations, creative multileveled translations which can teach us more
about literature and help us understand an author—in our case, Jeanette Winterson.
This is my foremost, basic belief and premise on which this dissertation is based. I
embrace a heuristic approach to translation and I do not attempt to focus on the best
way to translate Winterson (or a few, a small group of correct ways to translate it).
My attention lies on the extraordinary productivity raised from the convergence of
the creative Chinese translation of Winterson and Lacan, again applied through a
heuristic rather than a dogmatic approach. Contextualization and consideration of the
author’s cultural and historical background, or the lack of it, were not given and
should not be given higher priority than the production and analysis of various
exploratory Chinese translations.
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The second very interesting example which demonstrates the complexity of
Chinese translations of Winterson and how a translation may impact a source text is
the smuggling of anti-capitalism in the Chinese translation of Weight, 重 量 ,
published by Chongqing Publication House in 2005. In this simplified Chinese
translation of Weight, an additional assault on capitalism is smuggled into the
discussion of knowledge and the future, radically patent. In the chapter
“Boundaries”, on page 133 of the English version, the line “like all dreams the
details are strange” is replaced by the following short passage summarizing
Fukuyama’s idea of capitalism ending history:

历史的终结意味着科学的开端。历史的终结，一个具有煽动性的标
题。这就是福山选择它的原因。他认为，历史由相互冲突的意识形
态构成，现在资本主义已经成为全球的主导模式，因而历史被终结
了。 (124)

I have translated its meaning into English, thus:

The end of history implies the start of science. The end of history. A
demagogic title. This is the reason why Fukuyama picked it. He thinks,
history is constructed by a struggle between ideologies, now capitalism
has become the international leading model, therefore history is ended.
Jeanette Winterson never commented on capitalism in Weight, and therefore
this additional paragraph definitely seems a bit awkward. If we are to approach this
translatum from a traditional metempsychotic view of translation, then this translator
is definitely “deviant” since he “distorts” the source. However, instead of standing at
the patriarchal viewpoint, I would like to step back and look at this excessive
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paragraph from a different angle—would this idea be, in any way, similar to
Winterson’s recurring motifs?
Gender is everywhere, especially when it is used in a metaphorical sense. It is
about thinking patterns, and simultaneously about power difference. Isn’t capitalism
a hegemonic ideology which oppresses alternatives, like communism? Ideologies
such as capitalism and democracy become covertly totalitarian in the recent centuries
in that they seem to be accepted by most people as the way things should be,
including those who are oppressed in this system—and doesn't this collide with the
battle that Winterson fights for in her writings, i.e. the war against the dominating
faces of the Other? If we are to approach the issue from this perspective, it is not
difficult to see that the Chinese translator of Weight did not “deviate” from the
“writer’s meaning”—in quotation marks because, as discussed in page 6, every
image or idea that we perceive must go through our senses and mind, hence exists as
our construction rather than the thing-in-itself. In other words, it is impossible for a
(translator as) reader to really know the writer’s meaning; this “writer’s meaning”
can only be the reader’s guess, i.e. a fiction. Rather than a “distortion”, the Chinese
translator has, from a certain aspect, reinforced the “writer’s belief” by inserting
additional content that would, in the eyes of the target reader, collide with or explain
the “author’s motif”.

1.3

Jeanette Winterson and Lacanian Psychoanalysis

Another significant reason for me to have chosen Jeanette Winterson as a
case-study example is that her recurring writing motifs fit a psychoanalytic research
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approach. Winterson is somehow obsessed with the idea that languages form
powerful, invisible boundaries that restrict human beings in every aspect.
Throughout her oeuvre she keeps interrogating the nature of language and how it
shapes our perception of body, sex and desire, as well as how language helps us
tackle loss and sorrow. These topics, coincidentally (or not so), are some of the
major research areas that certain renowned psychoanalysts, Jacques Lacan among
them, have devoted their careers to investigate.
Lacan has placed unprecedented emphasis on languages, “the gift of Danaoi”,
in the formation of the unconscious and hence the Other. His teaching highlights the
relation between languages and sexuation, body, love, desire, jouissance, loss,
knowledge, truth, the reality, the unconscious and so on, which are all Winterson’s
recursive writing motifs. The similarity between their writing topics somehow
promises their compatibility as well as the productivity from it. It would not be
overenthusiastic or naive to expect Lacanian theories to provide us an insight into not
only Winterson’s writing but also every single piece of literature which carries the
themes suggested above, as well as the subject matter of translation and literary
translation. Also, if we are to apply Lacanian psychoanalysis from a heuristic
approach, it is not impossible for Winterson, or in a more general sense, literature
and the study of translation, to provide us an insight into the understanding of
Lacan’s teaching. This thesis, in other words, is based on a radically heuristic use of
both Lacan and Chinese translation. My application of Lacanian theories, even if
recognized as not absolutely “correct” (systematic, programmatic) to dogmatic
Lacanians—since Lacan himself never translated this way and he constantly gave
emphasis on the importance of the patient’s family and cultural background (which is
contradictory to my Death-of-the-Author approach)—would nevertheless help us
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understand (again) the Chinese translations of brief passages from Art & Lies, which
would then help us understand Lacanian theories more complexly as it is the use of
Lacan in transcending Lacan himself.
Winterson, as suggested previously, has always been fighting a battle with
mainstream ideologies such as heterosexuality, Christianity, and history or science as
the truth, which are, I argue, some of the dominating faces of the Other. These
manifestations of the Other shape our unconscious, restrict our desire and embody
themselves in the gaze of other human beings (or, in the eyes of a statue, a toy, a
camera lens, etc.). Through the return of the disturbing gaze from the others, we as
subjects are silently judged and questioned with penetrating accuracy. As a result,
Winterson attempts to challenge and undermine the long-established systems in our
society, “the-way-things-are,” which has long been internalized by the majority; and
in order to do so she promoting another manifestation of the Other, the Other-asanarch, the Other-as-child, etc., which would “liberate” us from the dominating
dimensions of the Other. Yet, we must not forget that this “liberation” from the
mainstream is, and can only be, a liberation in quotation marks, for this “liberation”
from the, say, well-accepted ideology of heterosexuality implies the submission to
another ideology, e.g. homosexuality or bisexuality, relatively less (outwardly)
supported but still a(nother) manifestation of the Other. After all, there cannot be any
liberation from the Other unless the subject abandons the Symbolic, which would
make him/her impossible to communicate with.
However, in order to survive as an individual in a society with so many
oppressive beliefs, it is the task of a writer, a translator, or even a reader, to
interrogate the dominating ideologies so that we will notice how reality and the truth
are constructed. There are various cultural norms that we have internalized as the
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truth, and for a society and the human beings to progress we must understand that
many taboos, many “unchangeable” rules, are culturally constructed hence are
changeable. Some people criticize Lacan for pessimistically destroying our hope,
since he denounces the stupid, unknowing subject as a helpless idiot who is entirely
controlled by the big Other, but it is precisely because subjectification is not fixed
that change, and therefore hope, is promised.
There is a Chinese proverb which I find to coincide with Winterson’s and
Lacan’s belief in language, and the problems stemmed from it: 解鈴還需繫鈴人,
“only the one who ties the bell (a metaphor for a problem) can take it off”. In the last
few decades Winterson has been working out a ways to re-gain our freedom through
language, the primary prison which confines us. The relation between language and
reality, hence restriction and desire, and everything as construction, is so intimate
that I firmly believe that psychoanalysis could help us to (re-)understand and (re)produce Winterson, and, on a larger scale, to approach the subject matter of reading,
understanding literature and translation more profoundly. This is how Lacan comes
into the picture. Winterson’s writings are structurally and linguistically so complex
that a linear perception of a coherent meaning is impossible. In order to translate or
to read, to understand, her work, we will need to find out the meanings of the text—
but whose meanings should we seek? A traditional reading method encourages
readers to look for the writer’s meaning, the “correct” interpretation of the text, as
they basically believe that the author has a quasi-theological power similar to Godas-Creator. (In Chapter 2 I will elaborate on the notion of the Other as Author-God in
the reader’s intersubjectivity, and compare it with the postmodern notion of the
Other as Text.)
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However, as hinted in the previous sections, it does not sound feasible to
attain the writer’s meaning, as we can neither penetrate the author’s mind nor access
the thing-in-itself, the “outside-ness”. It is, and can only be, our psychological (and
therefore fictional) perception that we bring to the text, our imaginary construction of
“the author’s mind”; readers can never know anything about writers apart from, or
without relying on, their own personal perception. This perception is, without doubt,
constructed, hence restricted, by the reader’s personal background on culture, politics
and religions. It is never possible to find a writer’s meaning, for it is impossible to
look for anything not-self, or without going through the self.
A writer’s meaning to a reader is, as a result, what the reader presumes as the
author’s meaning. As the subtitle of this dissertation has hinted, it is always the
reader’s interpretation of the writer: read my text and tell me who you are. When my
reader leaves me criticism on my writing, from praise and critical challenge I will be
able to tell how they interpret the text, in other words, how their mind is at work. For
instance, in my Facebook status I once criticized the Catholic church for conniving at
pedophiles’ perverted sexual assault on children, and one of my acquaintances
interpreted the word “perverted” as homosexual rather than pedophiliac, regardless
of the existence of the phrase “sexually assaulting young children” in the sentence.
He wrote back a very long criticism on “my” prejudice against homosexuality, and
his over-reaction leads to this question in my head—how could I ever predict that my
reader would interpret “perverted” as homosexual instead of pedophiliac, when I
have never thought that way? Rather than seeking refuge from my author-ity as an
author (to claim that I did not mean that), I simply explained to him that a person or
an object possessing few attributes simultaneously does not equate the attributes to
one another, and, if he was still unsatisfied with the “answer” (and he was not), he
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should feel free to interpret my text any way he wants since meanings lie more on
readers rather than writers. However, I could not help wondering why he, or his
unconscious, would immediately read the word “perverted” as referring to
homosexuality, as he is the only acquaintance of mine who did so. This very recent
incident, unexpected and foolish, nonetheless nudges me to think profoundly about
the reader’s intersubjectivity in reading ...
In the final paragraphs of the Introduction, I would like to briefly demonstrate
the flow of this paper. This dissertation will start with an investigation on how the
reader’s intersubjectivity influences the interpretation of texts, through the lens of
Lacanian psychoanalysis in Chapter 2. I attempt to compare the effects of the author
as Other on reading intersubjectivity to the effects of the text as Other on reading
intersubjectivity, and will provide a careful explanation why the differences in the
two Others do not bring about dramatic differences in the two subjectivities. Then, in
Chapter 3, I will apply Lacanian psychoanalysis briefly on some of Winterson’s
published novels. I introduce some key Lacanian concepts, such as objet petit a,
together with few of Winterson’s complex writings, e.g. The Passion and Art & Lies.
I attempt to explains the crucial role of objet petit a in repetition and obsession, and
link it with Winterson’s recurring plot and the obsession to repeat and sacrifice, most
patently shown in Atlas in Weight.
In Chapters 4 and 5, my experimental Chinese translation of brief passages
from Art & Lies will be provided, following with a detailed explanation on how the
application of Lacanian theories and their intimate relation with Winterson’s
obsession (repetition) play their roles in the production as well as interpretation of
the creative translations. Through my multilayered translation of the beginning
sentences of the first Sappho chapter, I attempt to demonstrate how a translatum may
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preserve multiple layers of meanings of the source text, particularly through the
application of homophones and, most significantly, to show how the target text may
create new (excessive) meanings to the text through the lens of psychoanalytic and
critical theories. This ambitious research topic, I believe, may function as a strong
refutation of the stereotype of translation as loss, or, from another perspective, may
highlight the intimate relation between loss and excess.
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2. The Author-God and the Text as the Other on Reading
(Inter-)Subjectivity

One major reason for me to have selected Art & Lies as my tentative
experimental translation target lies in the literary complexity of the novel. The
Sappho chapters in Art & Lies arguably constitute one of the most complicated and
intertextual texts of Winterson’s writings. To demonstrate the chapter’s
translatability, I have selected few specific keywords from the novel to carry out an
experimental translation. The first few examples are from the beginning sentences of
the first Sappho chapter, in page 51 of Art & Lies:

I am a Sexualist.
In flagrante delicto.
The end-stop of the universe.
Say my name and you say sex.
Say my name and you say white sand under a white sky white trammel of
my thighs.

It is neither fatuous nor hyperbolic to suggest that the sentences above do not
convey any coherent messages. Similar to many of Winterson’s skillful writing, this
very short passage is a conundrum formed by sentence fragments which have no
obvious connection among each other. But could it be possible that the relation is
written on the body of the text that it is only visible under a certain light? Apart from
raising readers’ interest and enjoying the pleasure of playing with language, one
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reason for writers like Winterson to put down linearly unaccountable ideas, i.e. to
render their texts as fragments, is that they want the words to function as a barrier
which rejects external authority—no external authority can be exerted on the
feminist/feminine text since it is only accountable to its own kind, only interpretable
by its own language and logic—because when anyone wants to impose masculine
logic onto women, Woman does not exist. As Lacan has theorized in “God and
Woman’s jouissance” in Seminar XX:

Woman can only be written with a bar through it. There’s no such thing
as Woman, Woman with a capital W indicating the universal. There’s no
such thing as Woman because, in her essence […] she is not-whole.
‘Woman’ (la) is a signifier, the crucial property (propre) of which is that
it is the only one that cannot signify anything, and this is simply because
it grounds woman’s status in the fact that she is not-whole. That means
we can’t talk about Woman (La femme).1 (73)

Women are the excess of and are unaccountable to the Symbolic as well as its
masculine structure. To read this feminine, i.e. disruptive, text, readers can only refer
one phrase back to the other, until the fragments collide and clash with one another
and we hear the echoes. The external authority of the traditional common reader,
who presumes, and is so confident with his assumption, that texts should follow the
“normal” structure and grammar and can be perceived linearly is here implicitly
mocked. The causality between two successive sentences, one of the most basic
tenets of “normal” writing, has no guarantee in disruptive feminine writings. This
writing style deprives not only the reader of his external authority over the text but
also the writer of her “theological” author-ity—even the writer herself cannot limit
1

In Lacanian psychoanalysis, something only “exists” when it can be fully inscribed in the Symbolic.
As for something which cannot be completely articulated or categorized by the Symbolic, such as the
Other’s jouissance which persists in mind as an ideal or fantasy yet does not exist in the reality (since
it can never be articulated), Lacan uses the vocabulary “ex-sists”, which “persists and makes its claims
felt with a certain insistence from the outside, as it were”. (Reading Seminar XX 35)
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the possibility of the text. To put this in a mystic way, human agents do not triumph.
Fragments do. Text does.
There have long been arguments on whether human subjectivity—of authors,
translators and readers—exists in both writing and rewriting. The answer to this issue
is, to me personally, extremely clear: no matter how hard some people try to ignore
human’s involvement in writing (especially religious texts) and translation, it is
undeniable that, from the Kantian notion, our perception is and will always be
limited by our senses and our very existence as homo sapiens. The subjectivity of
authors, rewriters and readers cannot not exist in the interpretation and translation of
the texts, simply because these kind of intellectual activities must go through our
mind. Since our perception is restricted by our sense, we can never know anything
without bias, i.e. without relying on our sense, our mind etc.
In Kant’s terms, we may never know “things-in-themselves”. Even for
concepts like space, time, (the existence of) substance or causality, our experience of
these kind of a priori concepts is restricted by human sensibility, hence cannot be
used to measure the “things-in-themselves”. For anything which appears in space and
time, it only appears when it is sensed by our minds. In other words, there is no
method to know anything without going through our sensibility. Therefore, the
“things-in-themselves”, the world as it is in itself, are forever unknowable, since for
anything to be knowable it must have been processed by our sensibility, i.e. biased.
In John Locke’s maxim, “[n]othing is in the understanding that was not previously in
the senses,” including the interpretation of texts.2
The subjectivity of the readers, especially before the postmodern and
poststructural wave, was significantly constructed and influenced by the Author. By
2

Note that the “senses” in Locke’s phrase is often taken to imply empiricism, which is to say, the
individual’s sensory contact with reality. I am taking the term here to imply phenomenology, which is
to say, the individual’s sense-based (but ultimately imaginative) construction of reality.
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using the word Author with a capital A, I refer to the abstract projection of the
authors as individuals in the mind of the readers, i.e. the readers’ psychological
(hence fictional) construction of the generalized author-itative figures of writers.
This Author, which possesses “theological” superiority and power and is very similar
to the big Other in Lacanian psychoanalysis, is first commented upon by Barthes in
his significant essay “The Death of the Author” (1967). When it comes to the term
“Author” with a capital “A”, we can think of authors as Other on reading
intersubjectivity from the readers’ point of view. The reason behind this concept is
that the Author is the readers’ subjective psychological construction in nature, hence
is considered as the intersubjective Other which is dramatically different from the
exact individuals of writers or rewriters as subjects.
One of the arguments that I have been making since the beginning of this
dissertation is that human subjectivity always exists in the process of reading, hence
also of translating. Regardless of the notable celebration of “the removal of the
Author” (Barthes 145) since the 1970s, an academic movement which prompts the
autonomy of a text as well as its subjectivity and afterlife (which allows and calls for
translation), human subjectivity has never been displaced in the study of literature.
The phenomenon of the emphasis on the Text , no matter how superficially it seems
to indicate an effacement or denial of human subjectivity, should not be considered
equivalent to such an effacement. In the era of postmodernism and poststructuralism,
the single theological author-ity of the Author-God which is “tyrannically centred on
the author, his person, his life, his tastes, his passions” (Barthes, 143) simply has his
role assumed by the Text as the big Other in the form of an impersonalized God—
which is to say that both the Author and the Text are subjective constructs organized
by the big Other. There is no Author and no Text outside the Other.
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Let me be very cautious and move slowly in this argument—here, I am trying
to compare the effects of the author as Other on reading intersubjectivity to the
effects of the text as Other on reading intersubjectivity. The interpretation of the
author as God over the text is the “traditional” reading style, which was an overprevalent phenomenon in the history of reading. This “normal” reading style, which
puts the writer on a pedestal, is still popular nowadays among the majority of nonspecialists who have no expertise in literary studies or humanities. When a reader
interprets the author as the author-itative God who decides, controls and knows (all
of) the meaning of the texts, s/he hunts for the author’s meaning by going through
the writer’s entire literary output, dictionaries, the writer’s interviews and columns or
other publications, etc., so as to figure out the single correct interpretation of the text.
The author is, in this case, similar to the omnipotent God who wields such total
power over the text that if the writer says s/he does not (or, ex post facto, did not)
intend a certain thing then that interpretation is a wrong and excessive deviation.
Here, the reader feels awe at the control of the Author, the generalized powerful
author-itative figure who is supposed to know everything in traditional beliefs on
reading, i.e. the Author as the Other.
However, when the reader encounters the text as Other, she considers the text
as either an opportunity to transform it into her own (i.e. to encounter herself in the
finished product of her interpretation) or as a complicated system which instills awe
in her. In this case, I call this sublime, “automatic” system (which has an afterlife,
which chases after life) the Text, with a capital T. The Text functions as (another)
Other of the readers which haunts us as a mystic, abstract, unfathomed energy and
knowledge with its own life whose multi-dimensional space is totally beyond the
reader’s imagination. The Text opens up countless opportunity to interpret written
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texts, but exactly due to this promise of an infinite possibility of interpretation,
authors and readers can no longer claim to know what we write or read. Our
linguistic, cultural, political as well as academic background obstructs us from any
ideal perception of the Text.
In the reign of the Author, there is one and only one correct interpretation of
the texts; any deviations will be punished. But after the Author-God abdicated the
throne in the Text’s favor, texts can no longer be completely interpreted, as
explained above, due to the demand of an afterlife and the translatum, i.e. a new and
never-ending re-presentation which guarantees the unexplored space of the Text.
This is what Walter Benjamin theorizes as “translatability” in his article “The Task
of the Translator” (Benjamin Illuminations). In this paper, Benjamin introduces the
concept of translatability, which governs translation:

Translatability is an essential quality of certain works, which is not to say
that it is essential that they be translated; it means rather that a specific
significance inherent in the original manifests itself in its translatability
[…] Just as the manifestations of life are intimately connected with the
phenomenon of life without being of importance to it, a translation issues
from the original—not so much from its life as from its afterlife […] For
in its afterlife—which could not be called that if it were not a
transformation and a renewal of something living—the original
undergoes a change. (71-3)

Benjamin believes that the continuous maturation of the text (through the collection
of fragments) can lead to “pure language”, which “no single language can attain by
itself but which is realized only by the totality of their intentions supplementing each
other”, and therefore the “eternal life of the works and the perpetual renewal of
language (74).
Therefore, thanks to the domination of the Text, the meanings of texts
become ambiguous, unlimited and impossible to be fully (re)presented. There is no
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longer any absolute standard of right and wrong when it comes to text interpretation,
but only different interpretive layers or approaches. This atmosphere of reading
skepticism, prevalent after the postmodern and poststructuralist wave, is enticing yet
double-binding in nature. The thrift of this belief which denies any absolute claims
may only rest on the basis of an absolute premise—that undetected interpretations
must exist. For one to claim that these are not the only, or the only small group of,
correct interpretations of a certain text, one has to make sure that there are potential
interpretations which are not yet discovered—and this is an absolute premise for
denying any absolute claims, thus double-binding. This logic is fundamentally very
similar to the validation of the paradoxical claim “I do not know every/anything.” An
affirmative preposition “I know I do not know every/anything” is a compulsory
condition for the absolute skepticism “I do not know every/anything” to function.
Built on a self-refuting premise, this paradoxical, absolute skepticism of text
interpretation has put on the mask of Reason but secretly triumphs through the
underlying mystic elements in its presumption.
At this point, it may be surprising that I reach the conclusion that the
differences in the two Others (Author and Text) do not result in huge differences in
the two subjectivities. At this moment you might be wondering: don’t we all agree
that when a reader interprets the author as God over the text, s/he searches for the
author’s meaning and feels awe at the author’s control; but when a reader encounters
the text as Other, s/he transforms the text into his/her own interpretation or feels the
Text instilling awe in him/her, and therefore should render us the primary differences
between the two Others as my searching for author’s meaning, versus my decision to
transform meaning into my own? The Author and the Text as Other are,
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superficially, contradictory to each other; however, it is arguable that to a certain
extent, the Text is not dramatically different from the Author.
To start with, the Text is, very much like the Author, a manifestation of what
Lacan calls the Other-capital-O, what Žižek renamed the big Other, an abstract
powerful unconscious force similar to patriotism or God. They do not exist
ontologically and are “nowhere in reality”, but it would be both shallow and naive to
suggest that these notions do not exist, for all the wars and murders in history,
initiated and encouraged by “the Fatherland” or God, can function as excellent
evidence of their existence. As Žižek has argued in Enjoy Your Symptom! (1992),
“We cannot explain the very material reality of fights and sufferings without
reference to it.” Billions and billions of people are willing to sacrifice everything,
including their property, family and life for the glory of their religion or country, or
for unconscious forces like freedom which wield tremendous power over us.
Sacrifice, no matter how selfless and holy it seems, must refer back to the self, which
is controlled by the big Other. In Chinese, there is an idiom 自編自導自演的戲, “a
play which is self-written, self-directed and self-acted”, which is arguably one of the
best definitions of the term “sacrifice”. In another mind-blowing book On Belief
(2001), Žižek introduces the two common falsities of the concept of sacrifice: the
first one resides on the underlying presupposition that one may only sacrifice
something that one possesses, while the second one is that sacrifice rests on the
notion of exchange, i.e. the subject sacrifices his property, honor, future or life so as
to gain something back in exchange. In Chapter 3, I will provide a more profound
investigation of the idea of sacrifice, as well as its relation to repetition, obsession
and the big Other (pp. 50-68).
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To summarize the discussion of the big Other briefly here, it is unwise to
suggest that patriotism or God does not exist since they leave a huge impact on
people’s lives, but on the other hand they never exist ontologically. They only exist
insofar as they are mutually constructed as a kind of intersubjective, collective and
abstract “power” which has no actual form or body but is nevertheless strong and
significant enough to construct, shape and restrict the way we see ourselves and the
world. And, the Author and Text that I discussed previously lie in the exact same
category with God or the Fatherland, which is “the Other” in Lacan’s terminology.
The Text is the big Other of contemporary readers, the formless God whose gaze
rests on us, endlessly criticizing and barring us from every interpretation of the text,
from our interpretation of the text, by pointing his finger at us and repeating his
command: “this is not the right one” (because there is no right one to start with).
Since there is no absolute correct interpretation of any text and there are infinite
possible interpretations, the Text consequently overtops the human as anOther
theological figure which forever questions and punishes us for our own
subjectivity—we, as human beings as well as constructed subjects, are limited in the
sense that our interpretation of texts is eternally bound by our educational and
cultural background (hence blinds us to an all-directional interpretation of texts).
This is the second reason why I suggested that there is no dramatic difference
between the subjectivities brought about by the two Others (Author and Text): When
we think about our personal interpretation of a text and our quest of the search for
meanings, the transformation of meanings into our own, the vantage point which
regulates our actions and decisions, comes not from the text, but rather from our past
English teachers, literature teachers or someone/someplace else. If the Text is the
(inter)Text(uality) that Kristeva defines in Desire in Language (1969), it is, again,
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(only) the big Other. This perspective of seeing the Text as Other can explain the
pleasure of the text theory suggested by Barthes, or, more precisely, can provide the
Lacanian viewpoint of Barthes’ postmodern reader-response theory.
Reading must obviously involve a reader, a person whose perception and
bias will inevitably influence the re-presentation and the absorption of the messages,
and this reader will, as Roland Barthes argues in The Pleasure of the Text (1973),
gain emotional reward in the process of reading. According to Barthes’ theory, a
passive reader who digests a texte lisible (readerly text) would gain plaisir (pleasure)
by reading as a subject, while for an active reader who engulfs a texte scriptible
(writerly text), he would be awarded a more extreme, intense and radical pleasure
which Barthes termed as “bliss”, and in French, jouissance. By reading actively, i.e.
with a critical mind which constantly thinks and questions rather than submitting to
the authority of the author and absorbing everything that one is told, the reader is
allowed to break out of the subject’s position (for a single split moment).
Barthes’ theory of readerly and writerly textuality is reasonable yet not
Lacanian enough. While agreeing with Barthes’ conclusion that reading a writerly
text yields jouissance, I intend to argue it from the opposite direction, i.e. that when a
reader reads a writerly text, s/he never breaks away from the Subject’s position but
rather occupies the position of the Subject to the purest possible extent.
The reason that I suggest a contradistinctive approach to Barthes’ theory is
that while a reader is reading a readerly text, s/he is learning from the text. Engulfing
the knowledge and attempting to internalize it into part of her or him, the passive
reader is constructing the Other which controls him/her and simultaneously s/he is
shaping the manifestation of the big Other which dominates him/her. In other words,
while reading a readerly text, the subject is busy building up his/her Other. However,
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a reader who is reading a writerly text is critically interrogating and commenting (in
the mind) on the materials that s/he reads. This seems to be very simple,
straightforward and obvious, but it would appear more complicated once I have
raised this short but significant question: where does the basis of a critical reader’s
judgement originate from? There can be hundreds of possible answers to this
question. It may stem from the parents or teachers whom the reader has come across
with in the past, those important small others who have constructed and shaped the
subject, or it may come from an inspiring book from a philosopher, or even (the
internalized teaching from) a novel, a short story, a soap opera, or a children’s book
that the subject has been exposed to in childhood. What does this actually mean? All
these examples which could possibly have constructed and influenced the subject
imply that while a reader reads actively, s/he is reproducing the voice of the
(dominate manifestation of) the Other which has long possessed him/her.
Here is a concise example: Imagine an uneducated old man raised in a
financially disadvantaged family in an extremely patriarchal-plus-religious society,
and a young woman who majors in humanities at university and was raised in a
society where human rights and freedom of speech are securely protected by law and
the mutual belief of the people. If we present a piece of a children’s story to these
two people, who are from very diverse educational and cultural backgrounds, they
would very likely come up with different, even possibly contradictory, themes and
morals from the same story, and, needless to say, diverse emotional responses to the
texts as well.
Why do people respond differently, sometimes even contradictorily, in the
interpretation of meanings and in emotions, to the same piece of text? One of the
most patent answers is that these people are constructed by different faces of the
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Other. For instance, a reader who is dominated by the Other-as-child and a reader
who is dominated by the Other-as-parent would interpret the same piece of text
differently. As a result, active readers do not solely absorb but also think and
question critically when they read writerly texts, yet their worldview and the way
their mind works do not appear from nowhere. Readers, if they are to read critically,
must be dominated by certain ideologies—mainstream or peripheral, but still and all
ideologies. This idea of all ideologies as constructions can, again, be linked back to
Lacan’s later teaching of syndromes: rather than the traditional belief that there is the
“normal” state and different syndromes, Lacan suggests that “normal” is merely the
norm of males—hence there are only syndromes. So, when it comes to reading a
writerly text, readers actively respond to new messages by retrieving the internalized
teaching of the Other, “normal” or not, which has already dominated them. In other
words, when critical readers engage in the process of reading, they are reading
through the angle of the Other, speaking and thinking through the voice of the Other.
In one sentence, they are reproducing the Other.
This is why I argue that readers who read writerly texts are, in
contradistinction to what Barthes suggests, occupying the position of the Subject in
its purest sense, which is simultaneously how jouissance comes into play. This
jouissance, yielded when a critical reader actively reads a writerly text, is the Other’s
jouissance. The Lacanian Subject enjoys being enjoyed by the Other, enjoys
functioning as the agent of the Other and enjoys the entire domination by the Other.
What Barthes calls the pleasure of the text in that sense is, therefore, what Lacan
calls the jouissance of the Other. However, it is noteworthy that this Other’s
jouissance is, instead of solely belonging to the big Other, also enjoyed by the
subject as a participant, an agent, a puppet. It is very crucial for us to realize the
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subject’s enjoyment, for it casts a positive light on this argument which might easily
be misunderstood as utterly negative (e.g. the impossibility of liberation). And, as
argued previously, on pp. 19 of Chapter 1.3, it is precisely because subjects are
dependent on the Other, which promises hope and change, that fixation is theorized
as temporary but not eternal.
Our discussion of a Lacanian perspective of the pleasure of the text theory
should probably come to an end. However, I must insist that my argument does not
mean Barthes is wrong in seeing the reader as breaking away from the position of the
Subject when s/he reads a writerly text. Breaking from and occupying the position of
the Subject are two sides of the same coin: Barthes focuses on the extent to which
jouissance derives from the loss of meaning (and hence subjectivity) and I focus on
the extent to which jouissance derives from the production of meaning; both occur
simultaneously in the process of reading.
From the delicate investigation and argument provided above, we can see the
clear relation between the Text and the Other, for the Text is the Other. Hence, it
would be understandable why human subjectivity always exists in reading, no matter
whether it is the Text or the Author that dominates the reading activity—both the
theological Author and the transcendental Text are psychological constructions
within our mind, therefore subordinated to human subjectivity.
I am definitely not the first person who has noticed this phenomenon.
Another renowned academic who has argued the Text as the Other, though subtly
and without any reference to Lacan, is Walter Benjamin. Benjamin is one of the
scholars who is publicly known for his enthusiastic celebration of the Text. In his
famous article “The Task of the Translator”, Benjamin’s mystic notion of pure
language and the texts which provide for an afterlife, i.e. translations and (therefore)
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re-interpretations, are apparently what I call the Text, the psychologically
constructed “entity”, the mystic “power” which “exists” and only “exists” in
human’s collective cognition. As Douglas Robinson argues in his unpublished paper,
“Walter Benjamin and the Deep Ecology of Translatability”, this God-like figure of
the Text, which has its own autonomy and afterlife, can be understood by the
ecological conception as a part of social behavior. Taking Benjamin’s “The Task of
the Translator” as the starting point of his argument, Robinson claims that:

Benjamin is concerned with human agents, at least some of the time—
that his mystified discussions of the mind of God and pure language and
the rest as superhuman or at least nonhuman agents are a kind of
metaphorical shorthand for an ecological understanding of human social
interaction that was available to Benjamin more as a largely inchoate felt
orientation than it was as a well-articulated (or even articulable) social
theory. (n.p., italics mine)

Instead of a truly independent supernatural entity, the all-knowing Text
(versus the impotent, not-knowing human) is an ideology, constructed and sustained
by our mutual, collective intersubjectivity which is formed by the impersonalized
generalization of the small other.3 The Text in this case is a mutually recognized and
approved “fiction” sustained by individuals’ intersubjective beliefs, which is similar
to a series of other abstract values such as morals, religions and patriotism. Although
this “fiction” does not exist ontologically anywhere in reality and its existence is
merely based on its real effects (which are carried out collectively by human beings
in a community), it nevertheless functions as a mysterious “force” which governs the
way our society works. This mystic intersubjective entity is, to apply Lacan’s term,
the big Other which “has a body and does not exist” (Seminar XVII, 66). This big
Other, as Žižek summarizes in Enjoy Your Symptom!, “possesses no substantial
3

A more careful explanation of the small other, as well as its relation to the big Other and the
Subject, is provided in the discussion of Schema L (pp. 66-9).
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actuality [as] it doesn’t exist as a Platonic world apart, yet neither can it be reduced
to a nominalistically conceived ‘abbreviation’ for the multitude of individual, really
existing entities” (52). Nevertheless, the Other dominates and regulates our actual
lives by functioning as “the locus of truth”, which is, as I argued before, by
occupying the place of God, as in Lacan’s description in Seminar XX, “the only
place, albeit an irreducible place, that we can give to the term ‘divine being’ […]
God (Dieu) is the locus where […] the dieu - the dieur - the dire, is produced. With a
trifling change, the dire constitutes Dieu” (45). As a result, regardless of the
superficial diversity, the power shift from the Author-God to the all-knowing Text
does not make any difference to the involvement of human subjectivity in text
production and interpretation.
“As long as things are said, the God hypothesis will persist” (45).

Given that human subjectivity is obviously engaged in the process of reading,
it makes a lot of sense for us to apply psychoanalytic theories to the understanding of
literature and translation. This is, I believe, an extremely useful and beneficial way to
approach literary texts. Most literary pieces are structurally, syntactically, and
semantically challenging for readers. For some complex writing such as the Sappho
chapter of Winterson’s Art & Lies, it is syntactically impossible to result in a logical
piece of text if we are to analyze it through a traditional (in other words “masculine”)
linear interpretive lens. To perceive (and therefore translate) the text in a
conservative way would only butcher the beautifully crafted text into a monosemous,
flat-toned narration. If a translator is to rewrite and reproduce the messages, s/he
must disentangle the semantic/linguistic knots and figure out the multiplicity of
Winterson’s esoteric writing. Therefore, Winterson’s confounding text “forces” the
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confused audience to not only understand but also give the text a meaning—but at
the same time the text refuses external authority (i.e. denies the meaning that the
reader gives it) as, first, it is almost impossible to interpret the text logically by using
one single method of reading, and second, no single means of interpretation could
cover the very high multiplicity of the text embedded in the fragments.
Yet, when it comes to a discussion of meanings, we should first ask whether
the lines constitute a coherent meaning, or, to take a more radical approach, whether
they constitute any meaning at all, if we are to celebrate the numerous layers of
meanings of the text. As meanings are, first, based on difference and deferral and,
second, generated in the reader’s mind (hence mental constitutions), they are much
more abstract than we suppose them to be. The best way to put it is probably as this,
that meanings are not non-existent. They are (generated by) the big Other—they do
not exist ontologically, but it feels as if they do. The double negations are probably
the nearest to the truth. This is also why a number of scholars have symbolized the
text as an onion—we cannot say that it does not exist, but to peel the layers off one
would only find out that there is nothing in the core. However, of course, nothing is
not necessarily negative. The void is not only part of an onion, but arguably the most
precious kernel of this vegetable, analogous to the void in Kindle Eggs and the
indeterminacy of meanings. This emptiness is the essential component, the condition,
of the existence of the onion-text, while the existence of the text and its meaning is
paradoxically marked by its non-existence.
Since meanings are not as stable and constant as they superficially seem, I
argue that in order to translate Winterson’s complicated texts we must adopt an
innovative means of text interpretation. “I am a sexualist. In flagrante delicto. The
end-stop of the universe” (51). The Sappho chapter of Art & Lies is so semantically
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and structurally complicated that it creates difficulty of understanding, and hence
translating, the text in a linear way. There are a few “problems” of interpretation that
we must solve in order to understand the text—for instance, we must figure out the
meaning of some ambiguous terms, such as “end-stop” and “universe”, so as to come
up with some possible meanings for the expression “the end-stop of the universe”. In
this thesis, I suggest the application of Lacan to the interpretation of the brief
passages from Art & Lies. The Lacanian interpretation of the text, or, the Lacanian
perspective of translation, should be able to provide valid and reasonable answers for
these questions: What are the various possible meanings of “end-stop”? How many
ways are there to interpret that phrase “the end-stop of the universe”, as well as the
Medieval Latin expression “in flagrante delicto”? How, if possible, may we preserve
the numerous layers of meanings of the source text in its Chinese counterpart
through a heuristic use of Lacan’s theories, or even to create extra meanings to the
target text?
In the next chapter, I will investigate the nature of transgression and provide a
discussion of repetition, compulsion and sacrifice. Through the Lacanian concept of
objet a, I attempt to link these notions to Winterson’s recurring writing motifs though
a brief reference to a few of her published novels, particularly Weigh, The Passion
and Art & Lies. I want to investigate the nature of transgression, for Winterson’s
innovative use of some established technical terms (e.g. end-stop) can, to a certain
extent, be thought of as a kind of “coinage”, which is against the “normal” way of
using languages and therefore transgression. And, in Chapters 4-5, I will go into my
experimental Chinese translation of Art & Lies, whose emergence and interpretation
cannot be separated from Lacanian theories and one of Winterson’s recursive writing
motifs, obsession.
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3. The Compulsion to Repeat and Sacrifice: Jeanette
Winterson and Atlas

3.1

Transgression

Language, the Symbolic. Grammatical rules are similar to the Law, guarding
the way meanings and logic works. Disturbance in the established system is
discouraged; improper challenge to the power of the Father is disapproved. However,
wherever oppression exists so too does repulsion. There is always a small group of
“liberated” people, “liberated” in quotation marks for they are free from the
dominating syndrome only, who would react, respond and rebound when they are
repressed. To escape from restrictions they break the rules, cast their steps over the
bottom lines—while the boundary, without doubt, progresses with them at the same
time.
Similar to the actual entity and the shadow, one never moves without setting
the other into motion. The transgression leads to inevitable failure since at the exact
moment that one steps beyond the Symbolic, the Symbolic surrounds and engulfs the
“extra” immediately since the ability to be articulated through signifiers, or imagined
as images, has already rendered the transgression into something proper. This is, as
always, a tamed transgression—you transgress, and at the exact same split single
moment you tame it. The Other tames it. Transgression never carries the essence of a
real transgression as the definition of a transgression is the impossibility to
transgress. Do I contradict myself? No, definitely no. Transgression, in an abstract
(post)structural(ist) conception, can never transgress because when something
beyond signification is suddenly made or turned articulable, the articulated “thing” is
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not the previous “something” anymore.4 Whenever one tries to re-present something
by a signifier, a painting, or any other concrete signs, symbols, sounds or strokes,
that “something” is not the represented “thing” anymore. Representation is, patently
implied from the spelling, a re-presentation. To re-present something is, therefore, to
re-mark—again, re-mark is another interestingly complex word which implies
something paradoxical from its spelling. A remark seems to be a supplementary
element of a text, but the term “remark” is a re-mark: remarks mark the text again,
mark on the text, rewrite the text, and therefore re-present the text. It is a supplement
which takes over the centre, and is therefore similar to the concept of a
representation. The re-presentation of something transgressive, as suggested above,
will inevitably alter the “something” and cast a different light on it when
articulated/signified. This is why Lacan believes that the truth can only be half-said,
“le mi-dire de la vérite”. For any transgression, as long as it is articulable, it can
never transgress. This is why I said the definition of a transgression is the
impossibility to transgress, because definition is signification, and signification is a
sheer re-presentation which can never completely refer to the actual transgression.
This can be reflected by new semantic meanings granted to old words, new
coinages or creative sentence structures in languages. They are transgressive when
they are first created, but isn’t it that the discourse sometimes engulfs new meanings
or coinages into its long-established corpus or linguistic system, so that the speakers
of that language can use the new lexis as a meaningful term, which especially stands
for something that doesn’t exist or doesn’t mean in the first place? Our realm of
4

However, it is noteworthy that from a phenomenological point of view, it is possible to argue that
transgression does exist since we may feel ourselves transgressing. Again, this feeling of transgression
is similar to other unconscious forces such as patriotism, or the loyalty to an unseen, unheard and
unproved god. These “forces” do not exist ontologically like gravity, yet they nonetheless speak,
construct and constrain us. The feeling of transgression relates to guilt, morality, social norms and the
Freudian superego, the gaze which constantly monitors us and judges us for our every single thought
and action, and therefore ultimately the big Other. From a certain point of view, there can be no
transgression when there is no big Other.
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knowledge and perception is dominated by the King Zhou (紂王) of languages, the
abusive king of the Symbolic—this is the hegemony of languages.5 For everything
articulable it cannot transgress in the Symbolic.
Let us think of the phrase “Brokeback Mountain”, which did not carry any
semantic meaning, nor even have any connotation of male homosexuality, before the
publication of Annie Proulx’s short story in 1997. How about the term “netizen”,
which did not exist before the emergence of the internet? These words did not exist
at the beginning, hence were transgression when they were first created and used, but
aren’t both terms considered quite common, and proper, uses of the English language
now? Their meanings and implications are not capricious, for no formal dictionaries
would provide dramatically different elaborations of the use and the meaning of
these two terms.
A never-before-existing vocabulary, a new coinage, a peripheral term, was
created—and very quickly it was assimilated and included by the centre. It is not
only netizen or Brokeback Mountain. It’s every single new word. Or, more precisely,
it is every single word. Netizen and Brokeback Mountain did not exist at the
beginning, but the same is true of every other vocabulary item that we use.
Languages do not stem from nothing, and they do change according to time. Which
word was not arbitrary in the first place? Even for one of the most simple words,
“you”, it was “thou” in medieval English. If we attempt to approach the matter of
transgression and arbitrariness from this perspective, then all words and languages
are transgressive in nature. However, that way would not leave us a fruitful
conclusion. Rather than labeling all signifiers as transgressive (or not transgressive),

5

This Chinese term is related to my creative translation of Art & Lies. Detailed explanation on the
cultural background of this king and its relation to the hegemony of languages is provided at Chapter
4.2.
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I prefer taking both sides at the same time. New words were transgressions because
they were never part of the established language, yet, on the other hand, they are not
transgression because whenever they exist, they are inscribed by languages,
signified, verbalized, articulated—by signifiers. By symbols. By sounds. By signs.
By the Symbolic.
In other words, every transgression is a tamed transgression for what is
articulated is not what it was, yet simultaneously every signifier, or every system of
classification, can function as a means of transgression. Since the truth can only be
half-said, there is always the unspoken half, the un-represented surplus, which Lacan
categorizes as what we call the Real. The Real never stops haunting us as Subjects,
for it is the remainder of signification. If the Symbolic is light (articulable,
decipherable and interpretable), then the Real is the shadow that always follows the
light. Transgression and propriety are therefore also similar to shadow and the actual
entity—one never exists without the other. This is why even proper names and
gender, the most fundamental constituents of a symbolic identity, are rebellious in
nature (See Chapter 5 for details). To put this in Lacanian terms, transgression never
exists but ex-sists.
If we are to look at the term “end-stop”, a specific term used in prosody for
a grammatical pause at the end of a line of verse, it has no coherent meaning with
illicit sexual behaviors or any universe. To interpret Winterson’s text, we should
generate other meanings for this word in order to interpret the text smoothly, and in
order to do this we will have to treat “end-stop” as a “coinage”—in this dissertation,
I use the word “coinage” to refer to not only newly coined vocabulary but also old
terms used with new semantic meanings.
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Formed by the two very easy single-syllable units of English vocabulary,
“end” and “stop”, the “coinage” (again in quotation marks, for there is an established
meaning of this term, yet it is insufficient for the understanding and translation of the
Sappho section in Art & Lies) does not seem too bizarre as the creation of coinages is
not uncommon in literary writings. Some coinages, originally created to enhance the
complexity of the texts or, similar to the word “netizen”, which is molded from the
existing words “net” and “citizen,” following the established etymological rule (a
citizen is a person who lives and participates in the city, and hence a netizen is
someone who “lives” and participates in the net, having the internet as a metaphor of
a concrete space), are generated to fulfill the need of having new reference to certain
specific new concepts or items. Although many of these new words turn out enter a
wider discourse and become part of our daily usage of language, they are
fundamentally a disruption of the established “masculine” (for Lacan “fatherly”)
Symbolic network.
Coinages are rebellious. It is difficult to tolerate coinages because they are
alien terms constituted by the existing, familiar linguistic blocks; even harder to
endure if they are “coinages” like “end-stop”, which are established vocabulary but
adopted as if new words that the old semantic meanings are not suffice for the
readers to understand the text, because this is the “wrong” use of the term, or an
“improper”, “arbitrary” and “perverted” way to use it. Coinages are the bizarre,
uncanny constructions built up from the intimate puzzle pieces that we get habitually
used to. If translation is transgression, a translation which includes new coinages
transgresses to an even greater extent because it generates foreign vocabulary, which
steps beyond the proper symbolic rules that we are confined in.
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When it comes to “coinages”, especially when they are old words with new
semantic meanings (e.g. “end-stop”), people tend to develop a kind of anxiety,
suspicion or even repulsion to them. They would often question the legitimacy of the
new terms, and sometimes would even hate them with a passion. It is not difficult to
understand that some people may get dramatically agitated by transgression, because
it is “incorrect” to violate the norms, but what lies beneath it, the core of their
contempt, wrath or disgust, is that the “coinages” highlight the paradox of the nature
of languages: the feeling of “coinages” as deviation emphasizes the legitimacy of our
“natural” use of languages, yet simultaneously draws the attention to the
unexplainable legitimacy of our correct use of languages. They draw the attention to
the naturalness as well as the arbitrariness of the norm, the Law, for naturalness and
arbitrariness are two sides of the same coin. This is the secret which should never be
articulated, and people often feel a deadly repulsion (or attraction, depending on
which one is stronger) to “coinages” or any other props which point out this secret—
that the big Other is inconsistent, constructed by humans and dead—and Subjects are
willing to sacrifice themselves to cover up the impotence of the big Other.
The emergence of new coinages, or any other kind of “transgression” such as
the use of homonyms and homophones (e.g. the wrong spelling of “there” as “their”,
or 姓名 as 性明), leads to the feeling of awkwardness that we would, nine times
out of ten, immediately know and feel is wrong. In other words, we may usually feel
the arbitrariness of that new/wrong word, which simultaneously signifies the feeling
of naturalness of our native language—that, for instance, “ 姓 名 ” is “right”
vocabulary for “name”, it is “the way things are”. As a result, when a coinage feels
like transgression, it, on the other hand, emphasizes phenomenologically the
naturalness rather than the arbitrariness of language, and it is because of the
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existence of the naturalness (the “norm” of using a certain language) that we feel the
bizarreness of the new coinages. This feeling of awkwardness, generated from the
transgression which ultimately confirms rather than challenges the norm of the use
and the construction of language, is probably one of the nearest experiences of the
inconsistency of the Symbolic that we may have. Although Lacan, working from
Saussurean structuralism, suggests that the Symbolic itself is inconsistent, this very
logical conclusion—that all Symbolic constructions are created by human beings,
and therefore can never be perfect; there is no reason why “dog” should refer to a
dog rather than a cat—seems to be impossible to be put under experiment in the
sense that we as subjects may not phenomenologically experience this arbitrariness
of language, for language is the condition of the unconscious and is the language of
the Other; what language can do, at most, is to let the subject experience, for
instance, the arbitrariness of a new coinage or any other kind of transgression, but the
most basic language must be at work for us to notice those arbitrariness.
Or, another scenario that we could come across with the arbitrariness of
languages is the moment that our norms get challenged. For example, a traditional
reader could actually say Winterson’s use of “end-stop” is wrong or invalid, because
“end-stop” has an established semantic meaning in prosody—yet, if another reader
who is more exposed to the postmodern and the poststructuralist means of thinking
asks the traditionalist why “end-stop” should mean what it means in prosody, the
latter could not provide any reason apart from it is the way things are, the norm, the
rules, and would highly get extremely annoyed by the “lunatic” thinker who
questions the majority. The traditional reader would be agitated, not because he is
correct but precisely because he cannot justify why he is correct—people frequently
feel an extreme repulsion to transgression, not (solely) because transgression is

46

“wrong” but most crucially because they cannot justify why transgression is wrong.
If we try to think about it, people tend to get much less agitated when it comes to a
matter of “facts”, but get far much more annoyed when they come across with
disagreements in more abstract ideas such as morality or social norms. However, no
matter how “liberated” one is, there are still some certain kinds of norms that one
would submit to, for Subjects may never totally abandon the Other—they are just
spoken by the different manifestations of the Other—and therefore there is still and
always some certain degree of “naturalness” in any critical thinker’s mind.
In other words, we as subjects may never directly feel the arbitrariness of
language, and this is another way to explain why we are always biased—when it
comes to the way our minds work, we may never escape from the inherently
inconsistent Symbolic constructions. The arbitrariness of the Symbolic, in this sense,
is similar to the Lacanian subject, in that the solid existence of the two of them are
impossible to be put under any test. However, this does not make Lacanian
psychoanalysis less reliable or plausible, for art does not require scientific proofs like
experimental data, as numbers only dissect art. The proven “facts” that we encounter
in scientific experiments are, again, within the Symbolic reality, thus restricted by
human subjectivity. As Lacan has repeated in his seminars, the truth can only be half
said, as there is always a residue haunting the articulated Symbolic realm.
As for the analytical-philosophical perspective on gender, masculinity and
femininity have more to do with the structural and thinking patterns—construction
and destruction—rather than the actual men or women. Therefore, if we are to
approach the subject matter of coinages from this angle, the act of creating coinages
is theoretically a feminine act, as it disrupts the masculine Symbolic order—again,
femininity as a disruptive thinking pattern rather than being like an actual woman.
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There are at least two significant reasons why thinking femininely in this argument
does not and cannot equal to thinking like a woman. The first reason is that an actual
woman can be voiced over by patriarchal or feminist ideologies which make the
woman not “feminine” enough: there are women as patriarchal agents and women as
feminists, and they cannot both be “feminine”, regardless of our definition of
“feminine” as either “submissive and weak” or “thinking and acting out of the wellbeing of women”. In other words, the phrase acting or thinking “like a woman” can
be extremely ambiguous, because it is impossible to define what quality a woman
should possess in order to be “woman enough” or “woman-like”, without going
through biased ideologies. Second, for an actual woman to think and speak she has to
submit to the Symbolic order and let the Other speak her, which is therefore spoken
through by something masculine (for gender as metaphors). In other words, the
femininity in transgression stems from the disruption of an established system or
norm, hence creating new coinages or engaging in any other form of transgression
refers to thinking, writing or acting disruptively, which does not make a person more
“like a woman”. Actual women are, similar to men, also controlled and constructed
by lots of (masculine) ideologies.
Transgressions challenge the masculine Symbolic order of languages as well
as of (the worship of) reason. Norms are a mutually-approved arbitrariness. The
“proper” way of structuring a sentence is merely the most common way of language
speakers have of doing so. Behind the absolute rules, there is nothing more to prop it
up. There is no necessary reason why Reason is the way it is now.
After the moment that coinages and their comrades highlight and challenge
the arbitrariness of the Symbolic order, its authority becomes hilarious. The creation
of coinages by combining two existing vocabulary items is one of the most severe
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assaults on the inconsistent Symbolic order, since it is an unknown generated by two
knowns, by, in our case, “end” and “stop”, two extremely simple monosyllabic
English vocabulary items whose usage we have mastered since childhood. The
emergence of an unknown from two unknowns is acceptable; the production of an
unknown from the combination of one known and one unknown is understandable.
However, it is much harder to accept an uninterpretable result generated by two wellknown and well-established linguistic elements, because a certain degree of
uncanniness lies in there. As the worst assault among the three, coinages generated
by the combination of two standard vocabulary mock the inconsistent and arbitrary
Symbolic order. If the masculine homage to Reason and the Symbolic is a kind of
idolatry, the production of new coinages and “coinages”, the repurposing of an
established technical term, is iconoclastic.

3.2

Repetition, the Beginning and the (Excess) Void in Limitation

Jeanette Winterson is somehow obsessed with the interrogation of boundary
and desire. Her love and hatred of limitation is beyond the imagination of her general
readers that they are merely represented by one or two of her novels that have
boundaries as the obvious writing motif, such as Weight. If we approach her oeuvre
with a critical eye, it is not difficult to notice that Winterson never ceases retreating
to these subject matters, as if forced to repeat the same quest through different
characters’ names, settings and narrative strategies. In her 2005 novel Weight,
Winterson confessed her uncontrollable addiction to questioning the essence of limits
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and boundaries, which are apparent to “any fool […] that these things were only
rules and taboos—customs made to keep people in their place” (104):

I chose this story above all others because it’s a story I’m struggling to
end. Here we are, with all the pieces in place and the final moment
waiting. I reach this moment, not once, many times, have been reaching
it all my life, it seems, and I find there is no resolution. I want to tell the
story again […] I return to problems I can’t solve, not because I’m an
idiot, but because the real problems can’t be solved. (137)

There is no exaggeration in suggesting that Winterson has the compulsory obsession
of returning to limitation. She loathes it, but simultaneously as a subject Winterson
enjoys and desires it. She keeps on telling the same recurring story of restriction and
desire while she is, as symbolized by Atlas, “[f]orever to be the same person[,
f]orever to perform the same task,” (69) because the process of perverted repetition
yields Winterson jouissance as a subject.
Unexpectedly for most “normal” people, obsession is a choice. “The ancients
believed in Fate because they recognized how hard it is for anyone to change
anything” (Weight 99). We love to push the responsibility over to Fate since “the
burden is intolerable”. An enormous amount of energy and effort is required in order
to break the gravitational pull of the past and the future—Atlas persuaded himself
that there is no choice. He deceived himself that no man can escape his fate.
However at the moment that he picked up the golden apples for Heracles, he was
shown the truth—he could have chosen differently, but he did not. He is, just like
Winterson, “always leaning on the limit of [him]self” and can never get beyond the
limitations because he never wants to. This is proved at the end of the story: when
Atlas lets his hands go and puts down the earth with the monstrous weight,
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NOTHING happens. And there was no burden and with Laika the dog he walked
away (Weight 150-51).
It is noteworthy that Winterson repeats the consequence of Atlas putting
down the world for three times on one page:

“Nothing happened”.
“Nothing happened”.
“Write it more substantially—NOTHING”.

What exactly has happened to Atlas at the end of the story, and how are we
supposed to understand this ending with Winterson’s own quest to explore
boundaries and desire? To answer the first question let us read the three sentences
very carefully: in the third representation of the consequence, the word “nothing” is
not only put in both italics and capital letters in order to give emphasis to it, but also
Winterson put down the word “substantially”—what does that mean? It refers to
Nothing as an entity, the sister of Nobody in Through the Looking-Glass (2000), a
sequel of the popular children’s literature story Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland,
Lewis Carroll has wittily presented a language play on linguistic categories: by
understanding the quantifier “nobody” in Alice’s “I see nobody on the road” as a
proper name which refers to an actual person, the King exclaimed in amazement and
replied “I only wish I had such eyes [… t]o be able to see Nobody!” (196)
In the final chapter of Weight, Winterson has put down the consequence of
Atlas rebelling against from his fate very clearly: this is a substantial manifestation
of the result of his transgression—NOTHING, as something, happened. This
Nothing has prohibited the cycle of repetition from recurring endlessly. It puts a stop
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to Atlas’ compulsion to sacrifice and enjoy—both occur simultaneously since he
yields jouissance from the never-stopping process of grief and suffering. The
masochistic impulse to seek the excessive pleasure through suffering. The deathdrive. But Winterson did not write a full stop for her own story. Unlike Atlas, she did
not put a prohibition on her quest on pain and jouissance, as literally implicated by
the name of the last chapter of Weight: “I want to tell the story again”.
Atlas’ story is Winterson’s story. Although Weight is not an autobiography, it
nonetheless contains authenticity as “there is always exposure, vulnerability, in the
writing process, which is not to say it is either confessional or memoir. Simply, it is
real” (xv). Atlas’ obsession to sacrifice and enjoy is, undoubtedly, Winterson’s
compulsion to repeat the myth. Suffering from the same fate, both of them attempt to
seek an excessive pleasure, or, in the more accurate and technical term from
Lacanian psychoanalysis, jouissance, throughout the process of repetition.
Repetition is painful and perverse because it brings a surplus pleasure. As
theorized by Lacan, the subject’s desire of repetition is based on a chase after the
objet petit a, the cause of desire which illusionarily appears in the objects of desire
but is never graspable for human subjects. In Žižek’s terms, objet a is an inherent
impediment which “prevents the circle of pleasure from closing [and thereby]
introduces an irreducible displeasure”. The psychic apparatus “finds a sort of
perverse pleasure in this displeasure itself, in the never-ending, repeated circulation
around the unattainable, always missed object” and this “pleasure in pain” is what
Lacan refers to as jouissance, the French for “enjoyment” which has a (lethal) sexual
connotation (Enjoy 48). For the intimate relation between death and sexual orgasm is
clearly reflected by the French term la petit mort, the little death, a French
euphemism for “sexual orgasm”. A similar relation is also observed in Chinese
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culture: we have the idiom 欲仙欲死, which indicates sexual ecstasy by comparing
sexual orgasm to divinity and death. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, sexual behavior is a
process which leads to jouissance—the subject shifts from desire to the domain of
drive through the rhythmic enjoyment of being, and at the moment that the subject
yields jouissance, he escapes partly from the Symbolic (from having the object of
desire to being the object of desire), and this can been seen as an ephemeral
effacement, i.e. death, of the subject.
We need to talk about the Chinese translation of Jeanette Winterson, or the
general subject matter of translation, with repetition because to translate is to repeat
(the source text), and we may argue that both translation and repetition are, from a
certain extent, derived from objet a. It is crucial to remember that objet a is nothing
but an entropy. In Enjoy Your Symptom!, Žižek has theorized objet a as “nothing but
a certain curvature of the space itself” when he explains the Freudian drive: “The
space of the drive is such a paradoxical, curved space: the objet a is not a positive
entity existing in space, it is ultimately nothing but a certain curvature of the space
itself which causes us to make a bend precisely when we want to get directly at the
subject.” Anyone who “possesses” objet a, for example, the lady in the courtly love
tradition, is “nothing at all, a pure semblance which just materializes the curvature of
the space of desire” (49). This leads to an interesting deduction that it is the
emptiness which makes objet a useful (i.e. functional)—since the Symbolic which
governs the “reality”, e.g. all Symbolic fictions, including the Text, is itself a
negative, bodiless entity. And given that “to translate” in Chinese is 翻譯 (fānyì),
with the first character 翻 meaning “to turn over”, we may again think of translation
as a means to repeat (the source text) in order to chase after the excessive pleasure
from interrogating the never achievable objet a.
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In Seminar XX, Lacan explains how language relates to the never-fulfillable
desire. In his comment on this expression of the relation between the signifier and
the signified, S/s, and the phallus, he equates the phallus with the bar between S and
s, because that barrier implies “a great deal of slippage between what I say I want in
words or tell myself I want and the actual object I aim at.” This slippage is what has
set desire at work—desire can never be fulfilled because “[d]esire’s object will not
sit still; desire always sets off in search of something else. Since desire is articulated,
made of the stuff of language—at least this is Lacan’s contention, his certainly not
being a naturalistic notion of desire—it has a very tough time designating any kind of
exact signified or meaning, pinning something down” (Fink 37). In other words, the
satisfaction of desire (which Lacan labels as the “phallic jouissance” since this
pleasure always fails to satisfy, while “phallic” is the synonym of “fallible”) is
always disappointing because the articulation of desire is always intruded by
language, and the nature of it (i.e. signification) marks its fallibility.
When the Subject is barred (i.e. castrated), das Ding (the Thing) is generated.
As the most intimate but simultaneously alien object, as central to but also exterior to
the Symbolic order, the Thing (and objet a) is, once manifested, never able to
“return” to Lacanian subjects and form the impossible imaginary fullness with the
mOther. Patients who suffer from obsession unconsciously desire to regain the
Thing, in which is manifested mostly the compulsion to enjoy and the compulsion to
sacrifice. As suggested before, repetition is a kind of obsession, and Winterson
retells the exact same story of the interrogation of boundaries because she is
obsessed with the pain in the structure of the cycle; she perversely enjoys returning
to the problem not because she is an idiot but not because the real problems cannot
be solved either—it is because she does not want the problem to be solved. It is only
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when the problem is never solved that subject can always come back to work on the
problem. This is the only means to ensure “the valuable, fabulous thing” is still there
waiting for her to chase after and gamble for.

We are not always conscious of it, not always aware of what it is we hide
from prying eyes or that those prying eyes may sometimes be our own
[…] Gambling is not a vice, it is an expression of our humanness […]
The hardship is a man-made device because man cannot exist without
passion. Religion is somewhere between fear and sex. (The Passion 7394)
This is her religion. This is her passion. “Passion out of passion’s obstacles” (71). I
said she loathes and loves boundaries, for Law is desire. In Chapter 2 of On Belief,
Žižek elaborates on Lacan’s teaching on limitations and desire: the Symbolic Law
“only elevates into a prohibition the quasi-natural obstacle to the full satisfaction of
desire” for “it is not the Law itself that bars the subject’s access to jouissance—it
simply makes a barred subject out of an almost natural barrier” (É crits 696). As a
result, the true Law or prohibition is theorized by Žižek as not imposed by external
agency such as virtue or reason but by desire itself. This is Winterson’s obsession to
repeat. “To avoid discovery I stay on the run. To discover things for myself I stay on
the run” (The PowerBook 3). She must keep telling the same story, as she yields
jouissance through writing and never finishing the one story—so that she can tell the
same story again. As a result, her novels are personal story books which were not
created to impress any potential readers: women, intellectuals, homosexuals, antiChristians; she wrote them for and to herself, because there is a real problem that she
wants and does not want to solve. It is through the compulsory repetition that
Winterson manifests her subjectivity, that her action is her subjectivity and solving
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the problem of limitation is to deprive her of her subjectivity. As she has put it in the
introduction to Weight,

Choice of subject, like choice of lover, is an intimate decision. Decision,
the moment of saying yes, is prompted by something deeper; recognition
[… T]hese returns, begin the unconscious connection with the subject, an
unconscious connection that waits for an ordinary moment of daylight to
show its face. When I was asked to choose a myth to write about, I
realized that I had chosen already. The story of Atlas holding up the
world was in my mind before the telephone call had ended […] Rewritten. The recurring language motif of Weight is ‘I want to tell the
story again’. (XIV, italic mine)

This is not her choice as a subject. This is a choice made by her unconscious so that
she could be a subject. If anything has chosen the myth of Atlas, it is the big Other.
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4. The Hegemony of Language, the Void and the Forbidden
Fruit: Objet a, the big Other and Repetition

Through the referencing of a number of Winterson’s novels in Chapter 3, I
have briefly explained the Lacanian concept of objet petit a and have demonstrated
its crucial role in repetition as well as obsession. Now, in this chapter and the next, I
will provide my experimental Chinese translation of the first three sentences in the
first Sappho chapter in Art & Lies, and attempt to explain my translation through the
application of Lacanian theories, and their intimate relation with Winterson’s
obsession to repeat the interrogation of boundaries.
I have translated the first three sentences of the Sappho chapter thus:

I am a sexualist.

私是聖論者。

In flagrante delicto.

偷食果時被人捉到。

The end-stop of the universe.

語紂的沒端。

Although a translator could translate the most patent meaning of a
polysemous vocabulary and list the rest of possible interpretations in footnotes, as if
they were optional, one of the very important and special features of literary pieces is
that they usually leave a significant ground of freedom for readers to invent,
interrogate and interact with the meanings of the work, and coinages definitely play a
vital role in this perspective.
In my experimental translation, I attempt to demonstrate a means to not only
preserve the numerous layers of meanings of polysemous terms like “end-stop” and
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“universe”, but even provide some additional (in other words, “excessive”) meanings
to them through the application of “coinages” and homophones. My experimental
Chinese translation contains both Cantonese and Mandarin pronunciations as well as
sentence structures, while one of the Chinese characters, 私 (self; private), is even
considered from the Japanese perspective as a kanji, the pronoun of “I”, written as
わたし (pronounced “watashi,” means “I” in Japanese) in Hiragana.
As explained clearly in the introduction, this dissertation is written based
on the foremost objective of the production and interpretation of an interesting,
creative and complex translation. The project is, again, not an attempt to search for
the “best” or the “correct” way to translate Winterson into Chinese, or any literary
texts into any language, according to traditional translation norms, for the
reproduction of the most patent meanings of individual sentences is not a translation
means which promises a significant ground or new avenue of intellectual inquiry,
especially when it comes to the investigation of human subjectivity and translation.
This thesis takes a heuristic rather than a correctness-based approach to translation
(and to the application of Lacanian psychoanalysis), and therefore the whole
argument is devoted to the exploration of a creative multiple-layered target text, from
which we may think more profoundly about some important Lacanian concepts (such
as the restriction of languages, the void, the phallus etc.), rather than the “best” or
“most defensible” way to translate Winterson into Chinese. In other words, I am not
attempting to translate Winterson “correctly”—as I’ve suggested, correctness is
based on traditional translation norms, the metempsychotic aspect—or to apply
Lacan in a dogmatic, systematic or programmatic way.
To begin our discussion of the experimental translation, I would like to look
at the third sentence 語紂的沒端 first, and then go back to the second and the first
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ones, since these two sentences contain tricky syntax, for instance the Cantonese
phrase 偷食果時被人捉到, as well as the interesting use of the kanji 私. After a
thorough discussion of these three phrases, I will look into the term 性明 in Chapter
5, my experimental translation of “name” from the fourth and the fifth sentences of
the Sappho chapter.

4.1

The end-stop

Let us start with the third sentence, 語紂的沒端. Before providing an
explanation for my experimental translation, I would like to look carefully into the
term “end-stop” in “the end-stop of the universe”. As mentioned in the early part of
the thesis, “end-stop” is a prosodic term which refers to the grammatical pauses at
the end of a line of verse. In poetry, a long sentence is often split into two lines
labelled as “run-on (sentences)”, and if we consider the universe as a line of poetry,
“the end-stop of the universe” can actually mean the ongoingness of the universe,
with the run-on sentences in poetry as a model of endlessness—even when there is
an end-stop at the end of a line, nonetheless the poem continues. On the other hand,
the universe as a line of poetry could also suggest the analogy between the literary
text and the world, the intimately intertwined relation between truth and fiction,
which again collides with Winterson’s recurring motif of questioning the authenticity
of truth in the manifestation of science and history, and hence can also be linked to
Lacan’s perception of self and Other (which are again superficially contradictory but
fundamentally intertwined). However, this “standardized” meaning of “end-stop” is
somehow insufficient and incomplete—the term “end-stop” patently can be
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interpreted as more layers of meanings, if we are to consider it as a “coinage” formed
by “end” and “stop” separately (rather than “end-stop” as one vocabulary).
Combined by these two very easy monosyllabic English vocabulary items, “endstop” should carry at least three plausible meanings.
Since the former term in this “coinage” is “end”, the first possible
interpretation is a spatial limitation. The end-stop of the universe can, therefore,
stand for the geographical boundary of the universe. The second possible
interpretation is a temporal limitation, a stop. This temporal restriction of the
universe can be temporary or permanent, though it is relatively difficult to imagine a
permanent stop of the universe. But there is something which would never revive
after a stop, such as a heartbeat (doctors do restart stopped heart beats, but that’s
artificial—the heart itself can’t start back up!). So, a permanent stop of the universe
could therefore be understood as the death of the universe, or, of course, an
ephemeral halt of the universe. The third very possible, but relatively less direct
meaning of the term “end-stop” is the beginning, or the continuity after the temporal
impediment, the stop, because ”end-stop” can be interpreted as “to end the stop”.
From this perspective, the end-stop of the universe is the beginning or, more
precisely, the continuity of the universe which therefore can be linked to the power
of birth or growth, which is 生 in Chinese. This character 生 (birth) is the essential
part of the constitution of the character 性 (sex) since there is a direct relation
between growth and reproduction (often implied in ancient Chinese texts including
the Daodejing), and this can function as a valid linkage between the “end-stop” and
in flagrante delicto.
The three (among the) possible meanings of the polysemous term “end-stop”
demonstrate the self-contradiction in this vocabulary: “end-stop” stands for an
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extremity, limitation and death yet simultaneously implies the emergence and
continuity. The paradoxical nature of the coinage is a mark of ambivalence in
Winterson’s writing, which emphasizes the ever-changing and arbitrary nature of the
world of words. This ambiguity in “end-stop” becomes a huge challenge to
translators. To preserve the multiplicity of coinages, I propose to create a similar
coinage in the target language, in this case, Chinese. The major reason that I am
against a metempsychotic translation (of the most obvious layer of meaning of the
text) is that the method of rendering a coinage into the most obvious meaning and jot
down the rest of the numerous possibilities down as footnote is a horrible way to
butcher a piece of literature (by which we would generate an insipid, flat-toned
monosemous narration). The multiplicity and paradox in “end-stop”, or any other
new coinages created by writers, is the core of the newly made words, such that if
multiplicity is leached from the text, the essence of coinages would be lost.
As a result, we must encounter the difficulty of translating a polysemy into
another language system, the more complex the vocabulary the more tricky it will be.
There is a question embodied in most translators’ mind, which is how it is possible to
preserve, if not all, as many plausible layers of meanings as possible in the target
text. It is true that we cannot preserve all possible meanings for all words and phrases
when we attempt to render them into another linguistic and cultural system, but we
do not necessarily have to retreat to the stereotype of “translation as loss” as an oversimplified excuse to this phenomenon.
There are, without doubt, many possible explanations of why equivalent
translation is impossible. Cultural backgrounds and connotations are one of the very
obvious reasons, while differences between sentence structure and linguistic systems
are another. One other major reason is that there are infinite possible interpretations
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of a piece of text, based on the family, educational, cultural, religious as well as
political background of the reader. As a result, it seems not possible to produce an
equivalent translatum, as the possible meanings of the source text itself is unlimited.
However, it is noteworthy that the unlimitedness of interpretation is, as suggested in
Chapter 2, not entirely unlimited, for it is very unlikely for a reader to interpret the
word “dog” as a kind of cheese or pencil. Meanings are organized by languages and
constructed by the Symbolic, hence restricted by the Other. Similar to the big Other,
meanings are not non-existent: they do not exist ontologically, yet exert influence on
subjects as a kind of unconscious “force”. This “force”, if it ever “exists”, can only
“exist” psychologically in our mind—it is mutually constructed as an abstract entity,
and therefore meanings are collective, which is why a “standardized” meaning of a
certain word would not vary dramatically from one person to another. We must bear
in mind that although meanings conveyed by texts are much less restrained than what
we believed in the age of the Author, it does not mean that there is completely no
restriction or orientation of the meaning of a word. In other words, the afterlife of the
Text does not develop independently from human readers’ subjectivity.
One simple argument which could demonstrate the flaw of unlimited
interpretations of the Text is that if it were true, equivalent translations would not
only be possible, but all existing translations would be equivalent to their source
texts, and all texts would be equivalent to other texts. If a source text may “carry”, or
more precisely, evoke, unlimited possible meanings, does that not mean that we may
also have unlimited plausible interpretations of the target text? Therefore, if it is true
that the Text has an unlimited afterlife which leads to an infinite possibility of
interpretation, then when we accuse a translatum of not being identical to, i.e. not
carrying all the possible meanings of, the source text, it was only us as restricted
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subjects (by the manifestation of the Other which constructs us) who could not read
other possible meanings of the translatum. If there can be unlimited interpretations of
the source text and unlimited interpretations of the target text, then certainly the two
cannot be non-identical? And, if we expand this argument further to an extremely
radical degree, all words should carry the same meanings since there is an unlimited
interpretation of a vocabulary. In other words, the meaning of “cat” and “dog”,
“dead” and “alive”, “comb” and “coffin” and “lecture” and “postcard” would
nonetheless be the same, or, they should at least share one layer of meanings which
are the same.
But of course, this is not the general case for language uses. The failure of
this argument, therefore, is already very obvious to us. Our discussion at this point
has again entered the mystical labyrinth, which is similar to the pure language
formed by fragments (i.e. human beings as biased and restricted subjects can never
see the whole picture of the fragments, yet this does not mean that the pure language
does not exist), and to solve this crux we may want to go back to the previous
argument, that we should bear in mind that the concept of “unlimited interpretations”
which bars us from any complete understanding of the text originates from the Text,
and the authority of this Text is fundamentally based on a self-refuting presumption.
Nevertheless, let us move back to the creative translation of “end-stop”.
Taking “end-stop” as an example, I translated it as 沒端, a new Chinese
coinage which conveys all three meanings simultaneously without the aid of any
footnote. 沒端 is a Cantonese homophone of the vocabulary item 末端, which
means “the extremity” or “the terminal”. The first character 末 is “last” and “final”,
while the second character 端 means “end”, “extremity” as well as “the tip”. When
it comes to the meaning of a tip, 端 is not restricted to the concept of a final end as
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we have vocabulary such as 開端, the start or the beginning, which is literally
“start/open-tip”. And 末端 is the opposite of 開端, which is literally the “end-tip”.
I have replaced the character 末 in 末端 by its Cantonese homophone 沒
in 沒有, which is “not-having” and “not-being” (which can be followed by both
concrete and abstract nouns or verbs, i.e. money, happiness or actions such as cry:
我沒有哭 is I did not cry). 沒 is “without”, not possessing something, or “not”, the
negation. Borrowing the homophone 沒 to replace the character 末 in 末端, the
new coinage 沒端 can, as a result, phonologically stand for “the extremity” but can
simultaneously be interpreted as literally “without-tip” or “no-tip”, hence stands for
the beginning or continuity.
As for my experimental Chinese translation of “end-stop”, the most
interesting part here is that the new Chinese coinage 沒端, apart from being able to
convey both the paradoxical meaning of limitation and liberation, the extremity and
continuity, it can even carry one more extra layer of meaning that the original term
“end-stop” does not and cannot possess. Besides being self-contradictory, “end-stop”
is self-limiting in the sense that the existence of a stop is the condition of an “endstop”. If we approach the issue from this perspective, the liberation engendered by
the third meaning of “end-stop” is just a husk; “to end the stop” implies the
necessary existence of a stop. In the world of an “end-stop”, the stop always exists
for the basis of all possible liberation and continuity rests on the stop—a stop whose
existence is to be ended, a stop which can never be ended. The stop is ended. The
phantom of the stop, never. The residue always haunts.
However, in my experimental Chinese translation, my coinage 沒端 carries
the (excessive) fourth layer of meaning, which is not restricted by the self-limiting
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feature of “end-stop”. For the English “coinage” “end-stop” has to be inevitably
bound by the existence of the stop, 沒端 is without any tip, stop or extremity, and
therefore can be interpreted as the void. 沒 is without, hence non-existence or
nothingness. 沒 端 is, as a result, a realm which has no tip, no corner, no
delineation, no restriction, a.k.a. a limitless space. It is both limitlessness and
nothingness, since the void is the only possible existing limitlessness—there is no
limit because there is no construction in the first place.

4.2

Of the universe

After this brief discussion on the ambiguous coinage “end-stop”, there should
be no argument that “the end-stop of the universe” can be interpreted as either the
limitation or the beginning/continuity of the universe (or, of course, both at the same
time!). However it is very important to ask, what is “the universe” in the first place?
If we are to check in any English dictionary, a universe is usually referred to as “the
cosmos”, “the macrocosm”, or even, in some of them, “the totality of known or
supposed objects and phenomena throughout space”. So, there is no doubt that we
may understand “the end-stop of the universe” as the end or the death of the cosmos,
the limitation of the totality of the known—doesn’t this resonate with the nature of
a(ny) coinage, as we have explained previously, the production of the uncanny, alien
and bizarre unknown issue from the knowns? If we approach this direction from the
psychoanalytic perspective, the known would then be the consciousness or
everything within the Symbolic realm—if “the end-stop of the universe” is the
limitation of the consciousness, then could it not stand for the hidden side of the
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coin, i.e. the unconscious? And, if “the end-stop of the universe” is the limitation of
consciousness or of the Symbolic, could it not be directly related to “in flagrante
delicto”, as this Latin phrase carries a heavy connotation of adultery, thus sexual
intercourse, la petite mort and the ephemeral disappearance of the Subject?
(Moreover, “in flagrante delicto” can also be interpreted as the presence of the big
Other, as I will show in section 4.3.)
As we should remember, “end-stop” can be interpreted as not only a
limitation but also a beginning/continuity—if we approach the expression “the endstop of the universe” from this perspective, it could then stand for the beginning of
the Subject, as false being, the ego, the consciousness, or of the Symbolic, and hence
would have a direct relation to the big Other, the formless God whose presence
penetrates the discovery of the immoral sin, “in flagrante delicto”. Even if we ignore
the role of the big Other in the discovery, the moment of realization of the illicit
sexual behaviour per se is probably very similar to the shocking and traumatic
liberation of the repressed, analogous to the decoding of the unconscious, which can
be linked to the painful and exciting—it is exciting because it is painful, the surplus
pleasure achieved from displeasure—rebellion against the consciousness, the
Symbolic, the masculinity.
The word “universe”, apart from the “standardized” meaning of the cosmos,
can also be interpreted as “uni-verse”, an antonym of “multiverse” which carries the
connotation of a single dimension, since uni- is a Latin prefix which means “one”.
To approach the term “uni-verse” from this perspective, it can be related to a “singledirectional thinking”, an insular and dogmatic perception of things, which can be
further expanded to a totalitarian uni-verse. As a result, “the end-stop of the
universe” can stand for the limitation of prejudiced totalitarian dichotomy. If we
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consider this reading of “the end-stop of the universe”, the ending of naive, biased
binary opposition altogether with “in flagrante delicto”, the latter phrase, about sex
and hence reproduction, can then link to the possible emergence of new life, new
belief and new idea. “In flagrante delicto” can, therefore, become the hope.
Similar to my translation of the term “end-stop”, I was eager to come up with
a Chinese translation which would incorporate most of the possible meanings. First, I
wanted to preserve both the meaning of the cosmos and a simple-headed narrowmindedness in the term “universe”. Second, I was hoping to render the target text
with a richer meaning than the source text (think of the surplus meaning of “the
void” in “end-stop”), in the sense that the writer’s perception of language and
naming (or, more precisely, any kind of signification) as limitation. I therefore
translated “universe” as 語 紂 , which is both a Cantonese and a Mandarin
homophone of the term 宇宙 yǔzhòu, the universe. The first character 語 is
language and speech, while the second character 紂 is from the name of the most
notorious king in Chinese history, King Zhou of the Shang Dynasty ( 商紂),
historically known for his dishonor and cold-heartedness as the worst (or the best?)
example of a corrupted king in China. There is an idiom 助紂為虐, literally “to
assist Zhou to abuse”, which means standing by idly while an (abusive) authority
treats powerless minorities unfairly. As a result, in Chinese culture, the character 紂
has a totalitarian, hegemonic and abusive connotation. And, if the term 商紂, Shang
Zhou, is King Zhou of Shang, then following the same logic, our Chinese coinage
語紂 can stand for King Zhou of 語, which is of course language. Therefore, the
homophone 語紂 could mean, firstly, the cosmos, since it is a homophone of 宇宙,
the universe—the phonetic pronunciations of both terms in both Cantonese and
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Mandarin are exactly the same. Secondly, 語紂 can be interpreted as the universe of
language, since 語紂 is a 宇宙 (universe) formed by 語 (language). Last but not
least, 語紂 can be the King Zhou of language, it can also stand for the (abusive?)
hegemony of language. But what is “the hegemony of language”? I have considered
different possibilities from the psychoanalytic perspective and have come up with a
few plausible interpretations of this expression:
To start with, it could mean the big Other who controls and speaks through
the barred Subject. Let us look at the Lacanian Schema L (Figure 1) for a more
careful illustration of the Other (and its relation to the Lacanian Subject). This graph
is presented in an article in Lacan’s collection Ecrits (2006), “Seminar on ‘The
Purloined Letter’”, which is designed to elucidate the intersubjective dialectic of the
Subject, through the demonstration of the relations between the Subject S, the small
other a’, the ego and the big Other A.

Figure 1: Schema L
Source: Lacan, Seminar on “The Purloined Letter”, Ecrits, p.40.
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The top left hand corner, S, is the stupid unknowing subject. Subverting the
traditional view of a “subject”, Lacan theorizes it as someone who does not know
rather than someone who knows. As Lacan says in Seminar XX, “there’s no such
thing as a knowing subject (il n’y a pas de sujet connaissant)”. (126/114) The
unknowing Subject, like Oedipus, acts without knowing in the conscious sense why
(he murders his father and sleeps with his mother). If we are to trace it back to
Schema L, the Subject is constructed and controlled by various self-perceived others
whose influence is demonstrated with strings in the z-shape as illustrated in the
figure. The party who exerts direct influence on the subject S is a’, the small other,
which is usually embodied by human beings in real lives, such as the subject’s
parents, teachers and friends, or even important men whom the subject has never met
in daily life but is significantly influenced by, especially ideologically, such as
political giants or influential philosophers (e.g. Karl Marx or Slavoj Žižek).
However, this specular small other, embodied as the important or inspirational
people of the subject, is not literally the “other” since the subject can never really
understand anyone besides himself (this self as the ego, the false being), as our
perception forbids us to penetrate other people’s minds. In other words, this small
other is merely the subject’s perception of the other, i.e. how I think my parents or
teachers think of me, and hence is precisely speaking the subject’s subjective
psychological (hence fictional) construct. This fictional construct is, however, strong
enough to superimpose on the subject, which affects both the subject’s selfperception (the ego) and the subject’s perception of the perfect self (the ideal-ego),
which therefore has an absolutely un-neglectable power which can regulate and
restrain the subject’s behaviors and, most significantly, thoughts. The small other a’
controls the subject through the imaginary relation which imposes an illusionary
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effect on the ego, a, which is located at the lower left hand corner of the schema. We,
as subjects, see ourselves occupying the position of the ego (instead of the hopeless,
idiotic Subject who knows nothing but is spoken through) and this is what Lacan
terms as “a structural anamorphosis of human’s psychology”. Lacan has once put it
in a tactful and ironic tone that “[the subject] may believe the ego is him”, which is
utterly a structural misrecognition (méconnaissance) in the human’s psyche. Since
the formation of the ego is based on the reflective image of the other, Lacan indicates
the nature of identification, in Seminar I (1953-54), as misrecognition: “Although
based on the recognition of the specular image, the ego can be conceived as ‘a
capacity to fail to recognize (méconnaissance)’” (153).
The lower right hand corner of Schema L is occupied by the big Other A,
which is an ontologically absent but phenomenologically present, impersonal
projection of the small other a’. It can be reasonably interpreted as cultural norms,
beliefs, ideologies or the mysterious voice which speaks us; the big Other is
structurally similar to the small other in the sense that they can both be the subject’s
psychological (i.e. fictional) constructs. Both the small other and the big Other are
the introjected otherness or outsider who plays an influential role in the subject’s
self-perception. In other words, Lacan has theorized human subjectivity as an
imaginary construction which relies on the introjected specular other. The subject is,
dramatically contrary to how we normally think of it, nothing but a stupid puppet
who knows nothing, who has its strings in the hands of the massive, unseen big
Other which is like “a formless god […who...] has a body and does not exist”
(Seminar XVII, p.66). This Other is directly related to language as, for Lacan, the
unconscious is “the discourse of the Other” and is “being structured like a language”
(67). Language is, in Lacan’s exact words, “the condition of the unconscious”. What
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does this imply? The significance of the Other originating from language lies in the
fact that the Symbolic order is a human construction in the first place, hence
inconsistent. This explains why Lacan has theorized the big Other the “dead” dummy
in contract bridge, la mort. This Other seems to be an all-knowing, all-powerful
Other but is actually incomplete, inconsistent and impotent—and this is how Lacan
interprets obsession. Rejecting the common perception that sacrifice relies on the
notion of exchange, Lacanian psychoanalysis explains sacrifice as “a gesture that
enacts the disavowal of the impotence of the big Other”. In On Belief, Žižek has
followed the teaching of Lacan in order to explain why the compulsion to sacrifice is
both superfluous and fake: “at its most elementary, the subject does not offer his
sacrifice to profit from himself, but to fill in the lack in the Other, to sustain the
appearance of the Other’s omnipotence or, at least, consistency” (70).
As a result, the big Other is the (impotent) abusive figure which controls and
speaks through the stupid subject and therefore can be implied by “the hegemony of
language”, i.e. 語紂.
The second possible link to the hegemonic power of language is the lethal
factor in the formation of the Lacanian subject. The process of alienation during
subject-formation involves a vel, the Latin way to put down either/or. In Seminar XI,
Lacan provides a classic example of his vel of alienation, which is the mugger’s
threat: “Your money or your life!” (212). Obviously, one’s freedom of choice is
restricted here because the only freedom one may achieve is to choose death. If a
person chooses to keep hold of his money, his life will be taken from him, then his
money. In other words, by choosing life and letting go of the money he will still be
alive, but if he chooses money then he will lose both (not just one or the other). This
is similar to the struggle between the subject and the Other. In the Lacanian vel of
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alienation, the subject is the money which “immediately drops out of the picture […]
in his or her confrontation with the Other,” which is symbolized by life in the
mugger’s example (Fink, The Lacanian Subject, 51). For a subject to exist insofar as
it can be spoken of and spoken for (though never completely), it must be beingless,
since to incorporate into the Symbolic, the subject must have given up being for
meaning/thinking. “While alienation is the necessary ‘first step’ in acceding to
subjectivity, this step involves choosing ‘one’s own’ disappearance” (Lacanian 51).
In other words, the disappearance of being for meaning is an inevitable consequence
of the intrusion of language. This is Lacan’s definition of his subject: “either I am not
thinking or I am not” (Figure 2).

Figure 2, Seminar XI

As this choice between being and meaning is, after all, a choice made when
one is deprived of the freedom of choice, Lacan’s vel of alienation and its lethal
factor can also be understood as “the hegemony of language”.
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The third possible implication of “the hegemony of language” is the power of
disavowal that languages grant to humans. As we do not have enough space in this
paper to go through this topic in depth, I will just mention it very briefly here.
Language is full of traumatic inconsistency since the relation between the signifiers
and the signified is arbitrary, in other words, the real may intrude in the superficially
stabilized reality through the inconsistency—what you claim is A can actually be B.
The emergence of language creates the possibility of lying, and therefore the
suspension of belief. Moreover, language creates the power of negativity, since there
is no negativity when there is no symbolization. Both of these can be linked to
anxiety and (the core of) trauma for human beings.

As a result, I have translated the phrase “the end-stop of the universe” into the
pun of 宇宙的末端 (the extremity of the universe). The original “end-stop of the
universe” could mean the limitation of the universe, the continuity of the universe as
well as the limitation or/and continuity of a flat-toned world(view). However, with
my new coinages we have formed the pun 語紂的沒端 (the no-tip of the king Zhou
of language), which carries at least four additional meanings: the first one is the void,
or the endlessness, of the universe, since 沒端 is without-tip. The second meaning
is the void of the Symbolic as 語紂 can be understood as “the universe of
language”; the void of the Symbolic is known as objet a, the cause of desire, the
surplus as well as a lack which rests on or is manifested as different objects of desire
but is never possibly grasped. (It is important to bear in mind that the translation of
“the end-stop of the universe” could stand for objet a, as this interpretation of the
phrase can be linked directly to the translation of the expression “in flagrante
delicto”, as I will explain in section 3.3). The third possible interpretation of 語紂的
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沒端 is the limitation of the Symbolic realm, which hence is a reference to the Real.
Last but not least, our polysemous Chinese translation of “the end-stop of the
universe” can also stand for the continuity of the hegemonic abuse of language; and
as for the hegemony of language, we may refer to the big Other, the lethal factor in
the Lacan’s vel of alienation and the power of disavowal and the suspension of belief
granted by languages, all of which I have clearly explained in the previous
paragraphs. And, from this perspective, if we focus on the last interoperation, the pun
語紂的沒端 can therefore mean the excess (e.g. the power of disavowal) originates
with the emergence of languages.
Combining the Chinese translation of the “end-stop” and “uni-verse”
together, we generate the phrase 語紂的沒端. Because of a—if you will allow me to
use this word—clever utilization of homophones, a discrepancy between the inured
“inherent” meanings of the terms (originating from the phonetic pronunciation) and
the literal meanings that the written characters stand for is created. This tricky tactic
of using homophones and puns has translated the ambivalent and paradoxical nature
of the phrase from the source text to the target text. My Chinese translation of “the
end-stop of the universe” can not only preserve the multiplicity of the source text to
an extremely high degree, but also generate new, additional (excess!) meanings for
the reading of the target text.

4.3

In flagrante delicto

“In flagrante delicto” is a (medieval) Latin phrase. First recorded in 1772,
this phrase has gradually been incorporated into the English language and is now
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well-known by all educated speakers of English. As an ablative case which is formed
by the adjective flagrans (flaming/blazing) and the noun delictum (offense/crime),
this expression cannot be translated into any simple English equivalence, as the verb
is missing. However, to achieve the closest translation, the phrase “in flagrante
delicto” could be rendered in English as “in blazing offense”, which means being
caught red-handed in the very act of committing an offense or a crime. Not restricted
to sexual transgression but often associated with adultery, this Latin phrase indicates
the discovery of an illicit behavior, usually in the midst of sexual activities. In other
words, this expression is about a discovery, which has a sexual connotation in its
ideological baggage.
Since “in flagrante delicto” is not English, I don’t consider it problematic to
translate this expression into a language besides written standard Chinese, as this
phrase itself is already “standing alone” in the source text. To preserve the feeling of
uniqueness and the impact of emphasis, we may consider keeping this phrase in
Medieval Latin rather than rendering it into standard written Chinese. However, the
difficulty in preserving the exact same phrase in target texts is that most common
Chinese readers do not know Latin, not even those who have attended tertiary
education: in both Hong Kong and mainland China, business and science majors
have almost no reason, nor chance, to learn a dead language, and as for arts majors
who are supposed to be interested in languages, English, French, Spanish, Japanese
and Korean are nonetheless more popular choices among students. Although “in
flagrante delicto” has entered the English corpus, non-native speakers over here
usually learn English as a second language for academic, business or communication
purpose, and therefore our syllabus for general English education tends to focus on
pragmatic and “useful” knowledge (e.g. English grammar, writing formal business
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letters or proposals etc.). For arts majors, I suspect that only part of the literature
students would know the expression “in flagrante delicto”, and I would not have
expected linguistics or cultural studies students to have heard of this phrase. As a
result, only an extremely small number of Chinese scholars would understand Latin,
and nevertheless the cultural force of the phrase would definitely be very different
for them than for their counterparts among source readers. Therefore, I believe that
in order to adapt the text for the target reader, we should translate the expression into
a language which is easier for general Chinese readers to understand.
Finally, I have decided to translate the expression “in flagrante delicto” into
Cantonese, under the thought that it may collide with my previous Cantonese
homophones in “end-stop” and therefore gives an integral feeling to the entire piece
of writing.
The Cantonese translation of “in flagrante delicto” is 偷食果時俾人捉到.
果 gwo2 (fruit), is phonetically similar to the character 嗰 go2 and is often
borrowed in (informal) written Cantonese texts, since 果 is an officially accepted
Chinese character but 嗰 is merely adopted in Cantonese to imply “that”, which is
rarely included in the corpus of Chinese input programs.
嗰時

together as a vocabulary item in Cantonese means “at that

time/moment”. 偷食 is to eat something (usually food) forbidden secretly, which is
a Chinese euphemism for having illicit sexual behavior. 偷食 is, therefore, highly
related to transgression and sin. 人 is human, but is considered a general 3rd-person
pronoun in this example, which means others, other people. 俾人捉到 is a passive
form of 捉 (catch), literally “being caught by others”. As a result, the expression 偷
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食嗰時俾人捉到 means being caught by others while eating (something forbidden)
secretly, i.e. being caught in the midst of illicit sexual behavior.
To eat something forbidden is to engulf extra food. In most cases, this extra is
a twin brother of a lack, like two sides of the same coin, as, if there is not a lack in
the first place, the person does not have to eat something that s/he is not supposed to
eat. This action of having extra food is very likely to be linked to repetition and the
oral drive, which is externalized when the gap between the goal of eliminating
hunger and the aim of satisfaction becomes obvious. This oral drive is, in a certain
sense, similar to the sex drive, and in this case there is an apparent similarity between
excess food and excess sex, excess jouissance. This relation between eating and
having sex, which are both considered biological needs (for sexually reproductive
animals) driven by basic instincts, is noticed not only by our Chinese ancestors (e.g.
Confucius said, 食色性也, both appetite and desire are nature) and in our culture
(e.g. 偷食) but also in the Western culture, as implied by the use of languages—for
example, metaphors of food for other humans, especially women, seems to be a
prevalent phenomenon in both Chinese and English language speaking countries.
In Cantonese, for instance, a pork chop (豬扒) is an ugly woman, a vegetable (菜) is
a girlfriend while a king crab (in Cantonese, “long leg crab”, 長腳蟹) is a woman
with a pair of long legs; in English, a lollipop is an attractive young girl, a
cheesecake is a half-naked female photographic model and a tart is a sexually
immoral or attractive woman. From the above examples, I suspect that the noticing
of similarities between appetite and sexual desire is universal.
One interesting common feature shared by the appetites for food and sexual
desire is that, as suggested in the previous paragraph, the gap between the goal and
the aim would externalize drive, and therefore lead to repetition. The drive here is, as
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theorized by Lacan, partial and lethal since it is structured around (and originated
from) objet a, the lack in the Symbolic network which both triggers and disrupts the
circuit (which leads to repetition). And here, objet a, as the core of repetition and as
the void (which is the essence here because a lack or a loss is the condition of desire
and drive), actually refers back to our Chinese translation of “end-stop of the
universe”, which could mean objet a, referencing to the Real and the void as
explained in the previous section.
Another interesting little point that I am eager to draw your attention to
concerns the two preconditions of the desire. Two factors must exist for desire to
present: one is the lack, and the other one is the prohibition. Let us first look at the
significance of a lack. Since a lack or loss is the required presumption for the
existence of desire or drive, the Subject actually wants the lack to be there so that
s/he can continue to desire. As in Žižek’s interpretation of Freud’s fort-da game, it is
the presence rather than the absence of the mother which creates anxiety: “it is not
that, anxious about losing my mother, I try to master her departure/arrival; it is that,
anxious about her overwhelming presence, I try desperately to carve out a space
where I can gain a distance toward her” (59-60). The Subject desires the lack
because without the absence there can be no desire or expectation of the mother’s
returning. In other words, the satisfaction is denied (temporarily postponed, as the
Subject believes) but desire is sustained. Instead of the usual idea of loss creating
anxiety, it is that anxiety occurs when the place of loss is taken, i.e. when the loss is
not there. Žižek applies this idea to emigration, arguing that those who are leaving
their countries feel upset not because people and memories from their hometowns are
irreplaceable and they miss them, but because they understand deep in their hearts
that their home countries will be replaced by a new foreign town very soon and they
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will not miss their own country anymore—the once familiar place will turn foreign
and the feeling of the loss (of the “root”) will disappear very soon. In Žižek’s
theories, this is what truly evokes anxiety. In other words, it is the presence rather
than absence which brings distress.
Also, desire arises because of the presence of the Law (which functions as
prohibition), the nom du père (name of the father), which sounds very much like the
non du père (no of the father). Desire is aroused through the acceptance of the
Phallus, the Law based on the power of the Phallus, the Name of the Father which
can be linked very easily to the No of the Father, the prohibition. For Lacan has
theorized the Phallus as an empty signifier, so that desire arises from the acceptance
of an empty signifier which stands for a lack. Again, we can refer this back to the
emptiness or the void of the Symbolic universe, i.e. 語紂的沒端.
Based on the argument above that, first, it is the presence which evokes
anxiety and, second, prohibition is the condition of desire, I suggest that in the
imaginary situation of (the discovery of) adultery—the meaning of in flagrante
delicto—is not restricted to sexual transgression, hence definitely not restricted to
adultery, in which two parties are willingly involved in the sexual intercourse, which
is why rape would also be considered in the later part of this discussion (pp. 83-4).
However, adultery is certainly included and referred to by this Latin phrase;
therefore, the argument that I am raising now is not unrelated to our discussion of the
text as well as the translatum. Adultery is not the only one but definitely one of the
possible interpretations of the phrase. As one of the layers of meanings, it is still
worth our attention to investigate how far this argument can go—the idea that couple
involved actually pervertedly wanted to 俾人捉到, be caught by the third party
(general). They were secretly eager to be caught by the other and, I argue, the Other.

79

It is normal for us to question immediately who would want to be caught in flagrante
delicto when their reputation, career, marriage or family may be destroyed, but this is
exactly how the unconscious works, it always functions in an absurd, “abnormal”
and “perverted” way—which is why those streams of thoughts are repressed by our
consciousness. The “sinners”, in adultery, desire to be witnessed and caught by the
Other when they 偷食 since the discovery of the transgression gives the ultimate
significance, the ultimate meaning, to the action of 偷食—this is a specific scenario
set up for the big Other. If I do not possess any lack, why would I have to take the
risk to 偷食? This is a delicate performance to show the audience, the Other (in the
physical manifestation of the others) that “I do not have the agalma”,6 i.e. there is a
lack in me, so that I can continue to desire.
In the above discussion, the phrase 偷食果時俾人捉到 was analyzed as 偷
食/果時/俾人/捉到, in which 果時 is considered as one term, a homophone of 嗰時
, “at that moment”. However, this Cantonese expression can be interpreted by a
diverse sentence structure, as thus:
偷食 (v.) /果 (n.) /時/俾人/捉到

As mentioned in the previous paragraph, 果 refers to “fruit” in standard written
Chinese. If we interpret the sentence from this structure, then 果, the fruit, would
become the object of the verb (偷)食. The phrase would then become: at the moment
6

In the early stage of Lacanian teaching, the term “agalma”, meaning an ornament, a glory or an
offering to the gods in Greek, is adopted as almost an synonym of the Lacanian objet petit a when
objet a was considered an imaginary part-object but not yet theorized as the leftover, the void. In
Seminar VIII Le transfert (1960-61), Lacan used the term agalma altogether with objet a, for the fact
that they are extremely similar in nature: the agalma is, according to Plato’s Symposium, a precious
object hidden inside a worthless box, analogous to the objet petit a as the valuable object-cause of
desire which we seek in the big Other. The agalma is the objet of desire which props up the fantasy
that desire is fulfillable; in other words, it proprs up reality and the (superficial) consistency of the
Other.
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that (someone) 偷食 the fruit, s/he is caught by others. Since 偷食 is to eat
something forbidden in a secret manner, the fruit that one 偷食 is a forbidden fruit,
the forbidden fruit, which carries the biblical connotation of both knowledge and sex.
Here, the sexual connotation resonates with the euphemism 偷食, which reinforces
the sexual implication of in flagrante delicto. Knowledge, as Lacan elaborated in
Seminar XVII, is a means of jouissance. When knowledge is at work it produces
entropy, a loss—this entropy comes from the use of signifiers to achieve jouissance,
therefore if the signifier (the phallus) is the stopgap to loss but the person pursues
objet a, i.e. loss, through it, then that act destabilizes the system of knowledge. In
plain English, most people use knowledge to answer questions and fill in gaps of the
reality so that they have a stable understanding of the world; however, for academics,
knowledge is not a stopping point but a tool which leads us to more questions. In this
sense, knowledge is entropic to a stable belief system. So, knowledge can remind us
of loss, which can therefore refer back to the term “末端” in the third sentence.
Moreover, it is the love of truth which is embodied in knowledge, while the love of
truth is the love of what truth hides, i.e. the love of castration. And, as for sex, Lacan
has put it in Seminar XX again and again (which later on becomes one of his mottos)
that there is no sexual relation. The impossibility of sexual relationship refers to the
idea that the big Other is the 3rd party which always has to situate between the two
people—and doesn’t it explain for itself why 偷食果時 the person actually wants
to, or even have to, 俾人 (3rd party general, i.e. others) 捉到?
The other part that I would like to devote time to discuss regarding the phrase
“in flagrante delicto” is the nature of forbidden sex. Putting this phrase in
consideration with the next one, what conclusions can we draw? What is the end-stop
of the universe? Is the forbidden sex a limitation (the forbiddance implies limits and
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boundaries in nature), a liberation (transgression as a liberation from the limitation),
or both? When it comes to adultery, we could approach it from three dimensions: its
nature, its product and its by-product.
There is no doubt that the nature of forbidden sexual behavior is
transgression. Adultery, or any other means of sexual “crime” such as incest or rape,
is a transgression of social norms, morality, authority, the Law and, last but not least,
the Symbolic order. All the limitations here have something to do with patriarchy
and masculinity. Adultery, when it is consensual, is an assault on hierarchical and
patriarchal beliefs not only because it functions as a sign of celebration or an illicit
achievement of women’s sexual freedom against the patriarchal authority and laws;
and when it is nonconsensual, in other words, rape, it is still a severe assault on
patriarchal values and beliefs because from a patriarchal point of view the woman
who is raped is stolen or corrupted (violated) by the rapist, as a thief, from the father
or the husband—in other words, the father or the husband is illicitly deprived of his
property by men who are not situated in the hierarchy of the family, hence is not
only an assault on the victim but also her male family members. This explains why in
an extremely patriarchal society, people tend to assault women as a kind of revenge
on their male family members.

For example, acid attacks on women are relatively

more popular in the Middle East, where people believe that disfiguring a woman’s
face brings not only shame on the entire family but also a huge financial burden to
the father, if the woman is not yet married (for it is unlikely for her to wed in the
future).
Therefore, although rape is the entire opposite of women’s sexual freedom,
the act of rape is nonetheless an attack on the established patriarchal law, morality
and norms simultaneously, since if women are property, rape is theft. Rape is,
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therefore, an extremely patriarchal protest against not only women but also the
“powerful” men (who “own” the women as daughters or wives), hence, against the
established, “normal”, “well-accepted” patriarchal law. Therefore, no matter whether
it occurs in the form of adultery or rape, illicit sexual behavior is an assault on the
established patriarchy, not only because it usually celebrates women’s sexual
freedom but also due to the inextricable fact that it transgresses established norms
(hence the masculine way of positing, labeling, defining and organizing things,
including the masculine Symbolic).
As a result, illicit sexual behavior implies the transgression of masculine
boundaries in the sense of the patriarchal marriage system, in both adultery and rape.
Some patriarchal societies try to make up for the “flaw” in the system by marrying
the rape victim to the rapist, yet this is to justify the means by the end; there is no
doubt that both the victim and the woman’s family is violated in the action of rape
(e.g. the father may have planned to marry the daughter to another family with a
better financial situation, and the rape would determine the plan and force not only
the victim but also the family to “choose” the “only” way), and this again makes the
action of rape transgressive and rebellious.
If we are to understand why forbidden sex is a transgression of the Symbolic,
we have to consider the second question: what is the product of illicit sexual
behavior? The very direct product of sexual intercourse is sexual orgasm—la petite
mort. Instigated by the shameful, forbidden desire, two people share each other’s
body (through the Other’s presence, as Lacan insists in Seminar XX, there is no such
thing as sexual relationship because “sexual difference is a function of one’s position
with respect to the Other”—which is why the general pronoun of the third party
(plural), must exist in my translation) and passion, the mixture of sweat and fluid
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(which leads to the possible emergence of an excess new life—I will come to this
when we discuss the third question, the by-product of sexual intercourse). A
disgraceful sin, a sinful disgrace, destined to end with the production of jouissance.
Isn’t the yielding to jouissance a process of the Lacanian Subject’s disappearance
(from the Symbolic order), switching from the mode of having to the mode of being?
From desire to drive, from the masculine Symbolic to the feminine, fathomless Real,
isn’t this an (ephemeral) attempt of Symbolic suicide? The extinguishment of the
Subject occurs simultaneously when sexual orgasm starts in that split single
moment…
Sex, reproduction, leads to the (possibility of the) emergence of new lives.
But for most illicit sexual behaviors, pleasure (or in the more specific term,
jouissance) rather than reproduction should be the main reason for people to commit
the act. In most cases, getting pregnant from adultery is, if not horrifying, at least
worrying and distressing news, since this brings dishonor to both the woman and the
(future) kid. So, one possible by-product of forbidden sex is a child whose paternity
is unknown. Without the acknowledgement of the father, the child cannot inherit the
surname and property of the father (as we see the relation between the words
“property” and “proper”: only “proper” individuals can inherit the paternal property).
The existence of this child is an excess in a patriarchal society; repeating to haunt the
impotence of the Father, the child would remain a surplus. This embryo, a metaphor
of the bud of new ideas and new directions, poses a threat to the Law. Remember
(the Lacanian interpretation of) the Oedipal complex: the child desires to be the
object of the mOther’s desire and hence competes with his father, and gradually
realizes that instead of becoming the object of desire it is better to possess it, and as a
result the child identifies with the Father (who the Subject believes is the target of
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the mOther’s desire), in order to determine what the Father has that makes the
mOther desire him. After entering the Symbolic order through this transference
(identification with the Father), the child Oedipally murders the actual father’s
embodiment of the role of the second Other (the Name of the Father, whose gaze
witnesses the Subject’s entry and interaction within the social Symbolic system of
normative behavior, as well as his barring from the non-Symbolic self) in order to
encounter the Other in anyone or anything, and thence enter a highly complex and
ever-changing social network. In other words, a child, especially an excess child,
functions as new, alternative ideologies, imposes a threat on the Father, the
masculine way of positing, depicting and constructing things. A child whose
patricidal impulse can never be tamed.
If we return to the idea of the new life as new ideas, doesn’t it sound more
persuasive for it to fight against the long-established authority, morality, the Law—
the uni-verse? And if we are to return to the metaphor of the embryo with mysterious
paternity as a by-product, doesn’t translation occupy the same position as well, in
that both are a surplus? Translation is an excess in the sense that it is something extra
(additional to the source text), something generated by the after-life of a text—and, if
we are to understand “In flagrante delicto. The end-stop of the universe” with the
notion of translation: doesn’t it mean that translation, the surplus of the source texts,
can function as both a limitation of the universe (of knowledge and belief) as well as
a liberation from the totalitarian single-mind-thinking, all depending on the role of
the translator? If we are to combine the reading (or translation) of the two phrases
“[i]n flagrante delicto” and “[t]he end-stop of the universe” together, we could have
achieved something more than all the possibilities that I have raised in the above
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paragraphs—for example, we may incorporate “the end-stop of the universe” into “in
flagrante delicto” by rendering them as 偷食語紂的末端果時俾人捉到.
In this (re-)presentation, the object of eat becomes 語紂的末端, which is the
void, objet a, the excess—and therefore can’t we understand this sentence as “eating
the forbidden void secretly and being discovered by others”? The idea of eating the
void immediately reminds me of Kafka’s short story “A Hunger Artist”—isn’t the
hunger artist in the story eating the Nothing, and isn’t this the manifestation of a pure
drive, partial and lethal? And isn’t it how it is linked to objet a and repetition?
Kafka’s work is known for the reference to the concept of the abject, while the
relation between the abject, the uncanny and the Real is quite obvious. All these
three concepts are about something beyond the Symbolic order, the traumatic core of
the uncertainity, which would therefore initiate repulsion and fear. Coming across
with the abject, the uncanny and the Real would have a traumatic effect on the
Subject, and therefore evoke jouissance. It is crucial to remember that rather than just
an extreme pleasure, jouissance is a deadly (dis)pleasure, which pervertedly leads to
an illicit pleasure. In other words, the idea of jouissance includes both attraction and
repulsion, both exist but which one is stronger would depend on the situation and on
the Subject. Some people would find sexual orgasm enticing, some may find it
horrifying, while still others would find both.
If we approach the Chinese translation of “in flagrante delicto” and “the endstop of the universe” in this way, doesn’t it mean a secret desire (forbidden yearning
for a pure drive) to be discovered by the big Other? And since drive correlates to the
Real of the Mother rather than the Symbolic of the Father, can we possibly see it as
the positing, defining, symbolizing and hence limiting Symbolic’s discovery of the
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disruption of the deconstructing Real? A transgression which yields jouissance,
which refers directly to our other example of interesting Chinese translation, 性明.

4.4

I am a sexualist

Sexualist in Chinese is 性論者, literally a sex-theory-person (a person who
believes in sexual theory), or 性主義者 (a person who supports sexualism). Apart
from the foreignness this construction carries (for the pattern of X-theory-person is a
direct translation of X-ist from English, i.e. X-ism person—a person who supports
X-ism), the term 性論者 is not very special. But, one interesting point here is that
the character 性 (sex), in Cantonese, shares the exact same pronunciation with the
character 聖, sing3, which means holy, sacred or saint. Although they are not
homophones in Mandarin, Cantonese is phonetically more similar to the older
language that ancient Chinese used when compared with Mandarin. (This has
explained why many poems written in the Tang dynasty only rhyme in Cantonese
but not Mandarin.) The homophones here imply an exquisite relation between sex
and holiness, which is against many stereotypes of the “traditional” Chinese as
conservatives who see sex as a crime or sin. In other words, 性論者, a sexualist, is a
聖論者, a person who believes in the theory of God or someone who worships the
sacred holiness. Didn’t some tribes from ancient cultures regard reproductive organs
such as the phallus and the vagina as symbols of mystic sacred power so that they
carved them into statues so that they could worship them? When it comes to the
discourse of religion and holiness, sex is linked to both the origin of power and the
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concept of contrition and repentance. As for the origin of power, it is proved not only
by the archeological evidence of giant statues or rock cravings—we may also tell this
from the use of language. In Chinese, the character 性 sex also stands for natural
property and deposition, while in ancient Chinese, 性 was seldom used as sex but
more often adopted as “nature”, which is very similar to physis in Greek. From the
constitution of the character 性, it is not difficult to see its relation to the notion of
(the power of) birth and growth since the right component of this character is 生,
which is life or birth. And of course, the other meaning of the character 性, sex, has
an extremely intimate relation with birth and growth through sexual reproduction.
When we talk about repentance, the moment of the discovery of a sin, in
flagrante delicto, is simultaneously the moment of condoning a sin. The conscience
is at work: the guilt that persists in the process of adultery is (and can only be)
alleviated when one is caught red-handed, “in blazing offense”. The nightmare about
the crime could only stop recurring after the sin is revealed and condoned. So, the
main point is about discovery. Why is the act of discovery so special? “To avoid
discovery I stay on the run. To discover things for myself I stay on the run”
(Powerbook 3). For Jeanette Winterson, discovery is something that we both long
and are afraid to achieve. It is about consciousness and the unconscious, the hidden
truth and the Other’s desire; it is a struggle between the inclination to achieve
pleasure and the innate death-drive. When we have nightmares which reveal the real
and let the reality drop, we always wake up immediately before the painted veil is
left so that we can continue to dream. This is what Lacan describes as the fantasy
propping up the reality. We awake in order to continue to dream, which is, in Žižek’s
explanation, to escape the real (the “psychic reality”) of our desire. To avoid
discovering what does not collide with our fantasy, we stay on the run. But at the
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same time our consciousness tells us that we want to discover so we stay on the run.
Both wanting and not wanting to discover, we stay on the run.
And now, I want to talk about my choice of the first character 私 in my
experimental Chinese translation of “I am a sexualist”, 私是性論者. As mentioned
in section 4.3, the 私 here is the Japanese Kanji for “I”, pronounced as わたし
(watashi). This is a gender-neutral first-person pronoun used in formal or polite
contexts, though in informal or causal contexts it is usually perceived as a feminine
pronoun. One reason for me to choose to adopt a Japanese Kanji instead of a Chinese
character for the pronoun “I” that I want to bring emphasis to this word, “I”, the
starting word in the first Sappho chapter in Art & Lies, for it is arguably one of the
most transgressive words in the Symbolic, similar to proper names.
What does the shifter “I” stand for when I articulate the word “I”?
“I” in the sentence “I am a sexualist” is an enunciating subject, the one “who
may take pleasure in speaking or find it painful to speak, or who may make a slip
while speaking. The enunciating subject is the one who may let slip something that is
revealing as to his or her feelings, desires, or pleasures.” (Fink Reading 24) If you
still remember the Schema L that we investigated in section 4.2 (Figure 1), the
enunciating subject “I” is the ego situated at the lower left hand corner. The ego
arises as “a crystallization or sedimentation of ideal images, tantamount to a fixed,
reified object with which a child learns to identify, which a child learns to identify
with him or herself” (Fink Lacanian 36). What is interesting about the notion of “I”
is that when a person speaks, s/he thinks that s/he is situated at the place of the ego in
Schema L. The enunciating subject always believes that s/he knows what s/he
speaks, it is him or her who has chosen which certain vocabulary to use in a sentence
so as to convey what s/he thinks—but of course this is an illusion. All
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psychoanalysts believe that apart from the ego talk (which is conscious, intentional
and alienated by the nature of language), speech is also controlled and shaped by the
Other’s discourse—any slip of the tongue or jokes reveal the unconscious, or in
Freud’s words, “the truth has spoken”. In other words, the enunciating subject thinks
that s/he is the ego, but the place that s/he actually occupies is the top left hand
corner, S, for the stupid, unknowing Subject. This is how my word play in 私
comes into the picture.
The kanji 私, わたし for “I” in Japanese, is also a standard written Chinese
character. In the Chinese language, the character 私 is “illicit”, “private” or
“secret”. For example, 私事 is personal/private matters, 私自 is to do something
secretly without the approval of authority, while 私吞 is to illicitly engulf benefits
or money (in corruption) while 走私, “run-secret”, is to smuggle. Interestingly
enough, the character 私 simultaneously carries a sexual connotation: for instance,
the word 私處, literally “private/secret part”, refers to the sexual reproductive
organs for both male and female. 私病, “private illness”, is sexually transmitted
disease. So the intimate relation between the ego, the character 私 and the context is
getting very clear—for 私 is a secret, the secret which has to be kept away from the
ego for eternity is that s/he is the Subject. Here I am not saying that we may never
understand the psychoanalytic concept of the Subject, for many scholars in this field
have written so much about a “subject”, or in the English speaking countries a
“patient”, an “individual” or a “client” (in some schools of psychology), as a noun
referencing the analysand. The “subject” in such contexts is, of course, le malade
(the patient, i.e. the sick person) who says “Doctor, I have a problem” or, if we are to
think deeper in this matter, it can be not only the face of the patient but also the
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whole defensive persona developed by the analysand to block access to the big
Other. However, this is not the Lacanian subject for it is, in Fink’s words, “neither
the individual nor what we might call the conscious subject (or the consciously
thinking subject), in other words, the subject referred to by most of analytic
philosophy” (Lacanian 36).
If we are to think of the subject from this perspective, we can never truly
experience the Lacanian subject by ourselves, i.e. to experience myself as the
subject, for whenever we think, we think as the ego. The notion of our experience as
Lacanian subjects can therefore only be an abstract, imaginary psychological
perception—I have to be able to think (consciously) before I know that I am and this
being in “I am” can, as a result, only be the false being, the ego. I can only think
(consciously) of the notion of (myself as) a Subject after I can think (consciously as
the ego). More precisely, it, the big Other, has to think me before the establishment
of the ego (hence the sense of self) because the Other is the origin of the language in
which the subject exists. This is why Lacan has implied the impossibility of
demonstrating the existence of the Lacanian subject in Seminar XXIII, “the subject is
never more than supposed”. In other words, ourselves as the subjects can only be our
assumption, i.e. our psychological construction raised from the conscious thinking,
the ego. Therefore, the idea of the Lacanian subject to us can be a very tricky one—
we can articulate it in English, in Chinese, in Japanese, or any other languages that
we like and we may “explain” it by seeking refuge from the deferring of the
signifying chain, but after all we cannot really know or realize, or in a more suitable
term, experience, what the subject means or what it is—it is not that the Lacanian
subject does not exist (nonexistent), but its nature is, I argue, analytically
unthinkable. This is why I label it as a secret: the notion of the Lacanian subject can
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only remain a secret to us, and this is the secret of the ego that s/he does not know
that s/he occupies the position of the subject, for it is forever beyond our to sense or
mind to really know this fact.
The second reason that I translated “I” as 私 is the context. Since the
character 私 in Chinese may connote an illicit action, we may see a very apparent
connection between it and the second phrase “in flagrante delicto” (which denotes
illicit sexual behavior). Also, “illicit” may refer to the idea carried by the pun of 性
and 聖 that sex is holy—in my Chinese (Cantonese) pun, a sexualist is someone
who believes in or practices the theory of God. Moreover, it is also illicit as well as
secret that what we thought of as a very natural, very personal ( 私) sexual
relationship does not exist, or for it to (somehow) exist God must participate (the
irony and the contrast of the sacred holiness and the dirty deed!)—the Other must be
situated between the man and the woman in order for a sexual relationship to
“function”. And if we link this back to catching red-handed as a scenario set up for
the Other (to believe that I do not have the agalma), we may think of it this way that
the secret of adultery is that its ultimate meaning lies in the discovery “in flagrante
delicto”.
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5. The Restriction of Language and the Alienation of the
(Divided) Subject: Proper Names and Sexuation

One of the most crucial theoretical concepts that I intend to highlight through
my exploratory translation is the restricting and alienating ability of language. To
investigate the limitative nature of language, I want to discuss the essence of two
vital constituents of the Subject’s Symbolic identity: proper names and gender. In the
first paragraph of the Sappho section in Art & Lies, Winterson emphasizes the
relation between language, through the form of proper names, and sex, in its
manifestation of the delicacy of the body. These are the fourth and the fifth lines of
the first Sappho chapter, on page 51. “Say my name and you say sex. Say my name
and you say white sand under a white sky white trammel of my thighs.” These two
lines have recurred in the later part of the same chapter, as thus: “The word and the
kiss are one. Is language sex? Say my name and you say sex. Say my name and you
say white sand under a white sky white trammel of my thighs” (66).
One significant concept embodied in these two lines is that by articulating a
proper name, a signifier, the speaker has articulated sex. In other words, there is an
exquisite relation between names as signifiers and sex that Winterson intends to
highlight. Therefore I asked myself, is it possible to show the intimate connection
between names and sex in the translation? Can I do anything more than merely
putting the literal meanings of these two sentences in Chinese? To think of an
innovative translation to demonstrate the intimacy between names and sex, we have
to understand how Winterson thinks of names, and I will be investigating this in
carefully later in this chapter. To accentuate the notion that to articulate a name is to
articulate sex, I translate the term name into 性明, xìngmín, which is a Cantonese as
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well as a Mandarin homophone of the vocabulary item 姓名 for name in Chinese.
My experimental coinage 性明 is formed by two characters: the first one is 性,
which is formed by the radical of the heart and the character 生 for birth and
growth. As mentioned in section 4.4, while a sexualist is a 性論者, the character 性
is sex/sexuality and nature or temperament, and can at the same time stand for
“gender”, which is 性別. The second character of my coinage is 明, an iconic
character formed by 日 (sun) and 月 (moon). 明 means brightness (光明) as a
noun when it is combined with the character 光 (light). But while the character 明
is interpreted as a verb, it can mean to ‘understand’ when it is combined with the
character 白 (white), to form the word 明白 (understand).

5.1

Proper Names, Naming and Translation: Restriction and Rebellion

The homophone 性明 is, as explained above, coined in order to enhance the
link between proper names and sex, a significant theme adumbrated by Jeanette
Winterson in Art & Lies. When it comes to obsession, Winterson is not only
obsessed with telling the same story of boundaries and desire, but is also obsessive
about the nature of names and the issue of naming, for naming is a means of
restriction in both Asian and Western myths. In one of the Four Great Classical
Novels of Chinese literature, Journey to the West (西遊記), there are two characters
whose assaults depend on proper names. One is the Pagoda Bearing Heavenly King (
托塔天王), Li Jing (李靖), whose pagoda absorbs people who answer him when he
calls their proper names, while the other one is the antagonist, the Golden Horned
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King (金角大王), whose purplish-reddish Gold Wine Gourd works the same way as
Li’s pagoda. When it comes to children’s stories from the West, one of the most
popular fairy tales about names is, without doubt, Rumpelstiltskin from the Brothers
Grimm collection. The imp Rumpelstiltskin, who had an agreement with the queen
while she was trapped in the dungeon about claiming her first child, left the baby
uninjured when the queen knew his name. Therefore, we may see that the concept of
naming as power is prevalent and universal in different cultures, and Jeanette
Winterson is definitely one of those who find this idea fascinating.
As we may observe from Winterson’s novels, she has felt a tendency to play
with the names of her characters since she first started her writing career in the
1980s. In her debut Oranges Are Not The Only Fruit (1985), Winterson playfully
names her protagonist Jeanette so as to imply the semi-autobiographical nature of
this Bildungsroman. Moreover, in the same novel there is another character whose
name is Winnet Stonejar, an anagram of “Jeanette Winterson” that it is formed by the
exact type (though not token) of letters. In Oranges, Winterson depicts a situation of
Winnet being spied upon, tricked and controlled by a sorcerer. At first, the sorcerer
threatens Winnet by declaring that he knows her name, which makes Winnet
extremely scared because “[i]f this were true she would be trapped. Naming meant
power. Adam had named the animals and the animals came at his call.” Later on, the
sorcerer persuades Winnet to lower her defenses and dine with him. She asks how
she knows she can trust him, and he says “[b]ecause I don’t know your name.” The
two of them ends up playing the game Hangman and Winnet says to him, “if you can
guess my name, I’ll be yours.” And of course he guesses her full name successfully,
based on the riddle that she has given him, and she becomes his apprentice (138140). From the above scenario, we know that Winterson is fascinated by the idea of
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naming, and that she believes to a certain extent that knowing a certain person’s
name is power—hence proper names may function as a form of limitation.
Naming, i.e. granting a person or an object a name, concerns power
difference. It is always the ones who occupy the higher level in a hierarchy that name
those who are, relatively, “inferior”—the most radical examples are that masters
name slaves and owners name pets. More subtle examples include the naming of
children by parents and wives taking their husbands’ surnames in marriage: in
traditional patriarchal culture, it is very normal, for normal is the norm of males, for
a woman to inherit the husband’s surname so as to imply that she is married into the
family. The person who is named always occupies the lower position in the power
difference, which means that, or is the reason why, s/he is restricted.
In other words, any naming ceremony, i.e. the action of naming, is more than
giving a person or an object a reference term per se. It can be interpreted as an
indication of a relationship—for instance, it may demonstrate the extent of
someone’s possession of power over me. Simultaneously, names can be regarded as
an indication of the degree of possession of knowledge about a certain person, for
intimacy influences formality (i.e. usually the better that you know me, the less
formally you will address me). When this relation between names and possession
develops to the highest degree, it is through the act of naming that one declares
possession—children have a tendency to name their beloved toys, yet they do not
name just any toys; they only name the ones that their dear mothers purchased for
them, because the naming ceremony declares that the specific toys belong to them.
Because there is never a valid explanation why a certain person or object has
a certain name, names, or any kind of significations, are always arbitrary; to name a
certain object is to establish an arbitrary relationship between a signifier and a
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signified; and yet the arbitrary relationship is established so well that the proper
names get deep down to the root of our being, that we feel so natural when someone
addresses us by calling our names. This is, to a certain extent, a hegemonic
subjectivization that the identity as well as the mind of the subject is constructed (and
hence limited) so much by our discourses that we have identified with and
internalized the alien signifiers as part of us—when we address the other person or
vice versa, proper names are not only necessary but come to us very directly and
naturally—we rarely stop and think, or feel awkward, for calling someone by his
name unless the name is a new one (e.g. newborn babies, or when an older person’s
name is changed for some certain reasons). As a result, there is an irreducible gap
between the “internal” (phenomenological, feeling-based, experiential) and the
“external” (objectivizing) aspects of the theory of naming. Regardless of where the
idea of the name originates from, blessings, names of saints or grandparents, to call
someone by a proper name is to (naturally) reflect and reinforce the internalized
arbitrary relationship between the signifier and the signified, which implies that a
certain person is a subject (of that name). What is a subject? The Lacanian subject is
the S in the top left-hand corner of Schema L; it is the unknowing stupid subject
whose existence can never be demonstrated. If we are to look into the spelling of the
word “subject”, we may see it as sub-ject, for sub- is the prefix for “under” and -ject
is eject, being forced or thrown out in a violent manner. A subject is, therefore, a
dummy who is thrown under tides of power and forces, and here of course I mean
the small reflective others and the unconscious big Other, as again demonstrated very
clearly in Schema L (Figure 1), an elucidation of the intersubjective dialectic of the
subject.
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The top left-hand corner, S, is the (divided) subject, which is directly
influenced by a’, the small other in the upper right-hand corner, which is usually
embodied by human beings in real life yet is merely a subject’s psychological (hence
fictional) construct. At the lower right-hand corner there is the big Other A, which is
an abstract and impersonal projection of the small other a’. Both a’ and A are the
introjected outsider(s) who play(s) a critical role in the subject’s self-perception (the
ego, a) and hence dominate the subject, S. This invisible big Other originates from
language and the Symbolic order, controls the subject by functioning as his/her
unconscious, which results in the alienation of the divided subject. (The split subject
is situated between ‘being’ and ‘thinking’ in the vel of alienation, meaning that either
S is not thinking—thinking in the sense of unconscious thought, and thus results in a
false being, or S is not.)
So, we as constructed subjects are restricted and alienated by language. But
why is a proper name a very special signifier which restricts us more than any other?
Bruce Fink has provided us a clear explanation in The Lacanian Subject: Between
Language And Jouissance (1995):

The empty set as the subject’s place-holder within the Symbolic order is
not unrelated to the subject’s proper name. That name is often selected
long before the child’s birth, and it inscribes the child in the Symbolic. A
priori, this name has absolutely nothing to do with the subject; it is as
foreign to him or her as any other signifier. But in time this signifier—
more, perhaps, than any other—will go to the root of his or her being and
become inextricably tied to his or her subjectivity. It will become the
signifier of his or her very absence as subject, standing in for him or her.
(53)

Until this point it is not difficult to see the boundary: proper names keep
subjects under restriction. But how to get free from this intolerable burden? To go
beyond the restriction we need translation. Jacques Derrida has raised a
98

groundbreaking point on the nature of proper names from a translation perspective in
“Des Tours de Babel” (1979/1985). In this article, Derrida argues that names do not
belong to any system of languages, i.e. they are the rebellious signifiers which resist
a total submission to the Symbolic. He denies the translatability of the proper name
like this: “It comments, explains, paraphrases, but does not translate. At best it
reproduces approximately and by dividing the equivocation into two words that
where confusion gathered in potential […] ‘Peter’ in this sense is not a translation of
Pierre, any more than Londres is a translation of ‘London’.” In other words, Derrida
suggests that when we come to proper names, it is not about good or bad translation;
instead, there is no translation. Not even the primordial proper name “Babel”, which
is “at once proper name and common noun, [signifying that] confusion also becomes
proper name and common noun, the one as the homonym of the other, the synonym
as well”, has ever been translated (109-110).
If Lacan believes that proper names are signifiers partly responsible for the
alienation of the barred subject, then Derrida believes that names are signifiers of the
indication of the alienness and the otherness of the system of language. Due to the
Symbolic deadlock that the proper name “remains forever untranslatable, [it] may
lead one to conclude that [proper name] does not strictly belong to the language, to
the system of the language, be it translated or translating” (Derrida 109-10). For
Derrida, untranslatability as the fundamental attribute of proper names marks them as
the improper and riotous elements of language, which remind us of the defect of the
imperfect Symbolic order; they are something which remains forever foreign, alien,
and other, something locating outside the system of languages and beyond the
Symbolic order. They symbolize both a restriction and a rebellion.
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5.2

Gender and Sexuation: The Empty Signifier

性明. 性 is a constituent of 性明, implying that sex/gender is a component
of a name. Gender, in Chinese, is 性別; 別 is difference, therefore 性別 is sexual
difference. What is the nature of proper names? As mentioned in the previous
sections, names give definitions to and restrict subjects, but surreptitiously resist a
total submission to the Symbolic. This is the same for sex, gender, and sexual
difference.
Here is the Lacanian graph of sexuation (Figure 3):

Figure 3: Graph of Sexuation

For Lacan, the difference between masculine and feminine subjects is based
on the phallic signifier, ф, but strictly speaking there is no sexual difference. As
Lacan himself has put down in Seminar XX, sexual difference, if any, is merely a
constructed fantasy whose authenticity is based on the phallic signifier, which is
basically an empty signifier that stands for nothing. As a result, this empty signifier
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inevitably refers to no meaning but failure in symbolization. In other words, rather
than a biological fact or a cultural construct, sexuation is a trauma of symbolization,
an eternal deadlock which implies the impossibility of symbolization, hence the
haunting presence of the Real which can never be captured in the Symbolic order.
The phallus is the signifier of the lack. We may think of the phallus as a
Symbolic stopping point before Symbolic loss. For example, a man purchases a
ridiculously expensive sports car as a symbol of his physiological manhood—this
sports car supports the narrative of his identity yet it ultimately symbolizes the lack
(here, the lack in his manhood is not equivalent to a lack of manhood; the man may
feel manly to a certain extent, yet there can still and would always be a certain
degree of lack in his manhood because the physiological manhood simply does not
and cannot exist ontologically. However, when we approach the argument from this
perspective, we may come to a very interesting conclusion, which i:, there is nothing
which has no lack. Why would I say that? Think about something which exists
ontologically—for us to be able to sense it or think about it, it must be symbolized to
a certain extent, which means, there must be a remainder left behind which is not
included in the symbolization; and surplus is, without doubt, the twin sister of lack—
the residue in signification implies the lack in the signifiers (that they are not
possible to symbolize everything 100%), and therefore whatever symbolized must
carry a lack, just like phallic jouissance must fail. And as for some mutually existing
concepts, what Žižek called the big Other, it is a formless God without a body, i.e.
ideologies which “exist” in our mind or unconscious as forces but do not exist
ontologically—and this would again be a kind of lack. In other words, there is
nothing without lack). The reason behind this is that the car implies not only his
manhood but his insecurity about it: we only need to supplement something that is
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not enough; rather than being very proud of his manhood, the man is worrying that
he is not manly enough and therefore he seeks refuge through the car. The same logic
applies to women who are obsessed with makeup. Women who attempt to achieve a
prettier or sexier look through makeup, instead of feeling content with their physical
appearance, (either consciously or unconsciously) believe that they are not gorgeous
enough, and it is the feeling of worry and insecurity which drives them to purchase
cosmetics. If we think from this perspective, the real job that a marketing strategy or
advertisement does is not to show the potential customers how good they would look
or feel after using a certain product, but rather to construct the stars or models as a
fantasy, an ideal which is so much better than the audience that the potential
customers would feel insecure or inferior and then would buy the product to fulfill
their needs. This reminds me of the Say’s Law (Jean-Baptiste Say) that it is the
emergence of an excessive supply (product) which retroactively triggers the demand
(lack).7 Rather than selling through the concept of identification (i.e. I will look like
Kate Moss if I buy this lipstick), it is the other way round, the advertisements are
raising our desire to purchase a product by differentiating and alienating us from the
artist or character in the ad through the renouncing of our insecurity. This interesting
example points out an important point in our discussion, that (1) a supplement is
adopted to fulfill the lack and (2) a lack can be retroactively created through the
emergence of a supplement. Therefore, the intertwined relation between a
supplement and a lack is much more complicated than we usually assume. This can
help us understand Lacan’s teaching of desire and repetition. To Lacan, desire is
7

It is now believed that the Say’s Law is flawed. Both situations of supply creating demand and
demand creating supply exist, due to lots of external factors (e.g. inflation, a large scale of
immigration). However, some people argue that the definition of “demand” should be purchasing
power rather than simply wanting (therefore a product must be put on sell before a potential customer
may buy it), and some suggest that the definition of supply should be counted in a greater scale (hence
when someone works to earn money to purchase something, the work that s/he does is always a kind
of supply to some other products or to the society).
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aroused by objet a, a lack which emerges (with das Ding) in the intrusion of
language—and Lacan suggests that we have language first, prior to anything for a
subject, and then it creates the lack (because of the slippage between the signifieds
and the signifiers), and then we chase after all kinds of possible things (for us to be
able to perceive these “things” we need to submit to language and hence no matter
how we approach these “things”, our experience is still restricted) hoping to return to
the state before castration. In other words, it is again the supplement (i.e. language,
for it does not come to us “in nature”) retroactively creating a lack which has to be
constantly attempted (and failed) to be fulfilled by chasing after (something created
by) this supplement. In other words, the sport car, as the symbol of manhood,
paradoxically symbolizes the man’s lack in it for it is the very lack which motivates
his search for symbols so as to compensate for the lack. And since a perfect
symbolization is impossible, every form of symbolization has phalluses and gender is
no exceptional case.

5.3

性明

From the above paragraphs, the similarity between proper names and
sexuation should be made extremely clear, i.e. the reasons of the coinage of the term
性明 should be fully justified. Both proper names and gender are conspirators in the
alienation (and thus formation) of the Lacanian subject. By reinforcing the wholeness
of the fragmented subject, proper names and gender simultaneously grant the subject
a Symbolic identity and restrict it. Aren’t these two actions always happening
together, both granting a Symbolic identity as a kind of symbolization, and
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restricting that identity, so that symbolization always fails? Both proper names and
gender are the essential constituents of the construction of a Symbolic identity, yet
they surreptitiously rebel against the Symbolic, i.e. refuse to submit completely to
the Symbolic order: the former through its untranslatability and the latter through the
empty signifier. Proper names and gender are both situated at the border of the
Symbolic, contemplating the verging on the fathomless Real which yields jouissance.
As we are told by Lacan, the movement between two registers (the Symbolic and the
Real) yields jouissance, which can be understood as a necessary outcome of defying
the Symbolic, hence an indispensable follow-up similarity between proper names
and sexuation.
Both proper names and gender are constructions of the Symbolic yearning for
a minimal escape from the big Other to the abyss of the fathomless Real. Isn’t that
how proper names and gender are similar to literature and translation, always urging
for a flight from lukewarm familiarity to the fertilizing, enticing yet terrifying
otherness of the new? And doesn’t this sound very much like sexual climax, la petite
mort? The longing for the loss of the Symbolic identity can be read as a longing for
Symbolic suicide, in other words, for death, or madness—and isn’t it the reason why
most non-scholars (or some over-conservative academics) tend to accuse us of being
hysterical and insane when we present homonymic translations like 性明 to them?
From the ancient Chinese culture and philosophy, all the ten thousand things
are constituted by yin and yang, with yang parallel with masculinity, the sun, day,
left and life, while yin is parallel with femininity, the moon, night, right and death. If
we are to read the character 明 iconically, isn’t the 月 (moon) in it much bigger in
ratio than the 日 (sun)? And can’t we reasonably see it as the capture of the split
single moment of yin dominating over yang, of death over life, of the feminine,
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unstable and disruptive Real over the masculine, stable and positing Symbolic? Also,
the character 明 itself is constructed by 日 (sun) and 月 (moon), which again can
be read as a symbolization of yang and yin (hence men and women), which refers
back to the character 性 (sex/gender) in 性明.
Moreover, 明 in its verb form is “to understand”. When we consider 明
with 性 , and altogether 性 明 , it implies that to understand name as sexual
difference and restriction, as well as to notice the restrictive plus rebellious nature of
proper names and sexuation (i.e. to understand them as fundamentally empty cultural
constructions which fragmentize and alienate us as subjects), is intellectually smart
enough to really 明, understand, what names and languages are.
Therefore, 性明, more than a sheer acoustic Chinese homonym of 姓名, is
in fact both a semantic and dynamic iconic manifestation of the rebellious nature of
proper names and sexuation, a picture of the moment of the verging on the absent
Real, and hence Symbolic suicide.
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6. Conclusion

This dissertation is a Lacanian perspective on literature, translation and the
activity of reading. Through the investigation of reader’s intersubjectivity and an
attempt plus discussion of the psychoanalytic approach to translate Winterson’s Art
& Lies, I have sought to argue the following points:

(1) The emergence and transmission of meanings are never unidirectional. Contrary
to the mainstream belief that, having been put by writers into the texts, meanings
sit there waiting for a reader to perceive them, the approach I have adopted here
sees readers as playing an equally important, or arguably more influential role, in
the construction of meanings.
(2) A psychoanalytical approach to translation may help us rethink the definition of
the term “translation”. When the production of a translatum through alternative
means may result in a target text which carries more potential layers of
interpretation, we may want to question the mainstream ideology of a
metempsychotic translation.
(3) The challenge of the definition of a “translation” evokes our consideration of the
task of a scholar and the need of a perpetual undermining and overthrowing of
the centre, which ensures the development and progress of our knowledge.

6.1

The Construction and Transmission of Meanings
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There is no doubt that authors have a huge influence on the transmission of
meanings through the text. When we are presented the phrase, for instance, “the endstop of the universe”, it is quite unlikely that a sane reader will be reminded of
bulldogs or cheese. However, I insisted on using the word “transmission” rather than
“construction” when I described the relation between authors and texts, because
meanings are constructed by readers rather than writers. Although authors’ influence
on texts is unarguably enormous, it is on the other hand not as dramatic as people
commonsensically believe. As I have demonstrated clearly in this thesis, the
construction of meanings occurs in the minds of readers, making meanings readers’
psychological (hence fictional) construction and the projection of the writers (rather
than the individual writers per se) and therefore are definitely intertwined with
readers’ (inter)subjectivity. The traditional belief, which is very popular in the
mainstream, about not only translation but also the construction and transmission of
meanings is refuted in this dissertation.
If metempsychotic translation is really the way things are, then meanings are
the essence of texts and languages are merely the carriers. Translation and reading
are therefore both mechanical processes and:
(1) Equivalent translations can be achieved;
(2) Human subjectivity is not involved in the process of translation;
(3) It is possible to know the meanings or intentions, i.e. the mind, of writers
through reading, since it is writers who put the meanings (soul) into the texts,
and therefore
(4) Meanings are solely dependent on writers. Readers’ only job is to decode
those meanings and therefore be subordinate to the author-ity of the writers, If
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a reader interprets something different from the intention of the writer, it must
be a mistake or a deviation.

But of course, our understanding of meanings and translation has proved all the four
conclusions above wrong. As I have explained with concrete examples in this paper:
(1) It is impossible to achieve an equivalent translation due to both linguistic and
cultural limitation;
(2) Human subjectivity is involved in the process of reading, and
(3) It is impossible to read the mind of the writers, and
(4) Meanings depend more on readers than writers precisely because they are not
really “transmitted” through a medium (language) but are created in the mind
of the readers (under the limitation of the writers, of course, as we won’t
interpret “end-stop” as a keyboard).

In other words, even though the writer has definitely attempted to direct the reader’s
mind to a certain way of thinking, the “space” that we may move around in the
construction of meaning is not as restrictive as people usually think. This notion of
the generation of meanings as somewhere between the writers and readers is not an
innovative one—however, I would like to take this thesis as my first step in the
investigation of the construction and transmission of meanings, and most importantly
to explain how a large number of language users in a linguistic and cultural group
can understand a certain word in a very similar way while some readers may
interpret the text differently or even contrastingly. I am hoping that the answers to
these questions may explain the ultimate question in the construction or transmission
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of meanings, which is, how writers may restrict the interpretation of meanings in the
readers mind when meanings are the psychological constructions of the readers.

6.2

Reading Psychoanalytically as an Alternative Translation Strategy, and

the Task of a Scholar

A psychoanalytical approach to translation can produce target texts which
carry more meanings than the source texts, as carefully demonstrated by my
experimental Chinese translation of Art & Lies. One problem that I expect to
encounter in my research direction is that the majority, who are so contently and
comfortably situated within the centre while naturalizing it (unconsciously) as the
normal way that things should/must be, will resist it as opposed to what Douglas
Robinson calls metempsychotic translation: Surely it is XYZ, everyone agrees that it
is XYZ and certainly you want it to be this way, don’t you? It is hegemonic, and
therefore “correct” and “natural,” to assign the author total author-ity, and to regard
as flawed a translation that deviates from authorial intention, whether by adding to or
subtracting from the source text.
Ultimately, what they articulate is that a translation is flawed just because it is
not the source text. All translations are bad translations because they are not the
originals. While critics rarely say this outright, and might even be inclined to deny
that any such view undergirds their claims, I argue that this simplistic orientation to
translations is in fact surprisingly common. If I am right, surely it is our duty as
scholars to identify and root out such assumptions. Although metempsychotic
translation is very tempting and “plausible” as it occupies the position of the centre,
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my remarks about readers’ intersubjectivity and the logic at work behind
metempsychotic translation strongly suggest that this approach to translation is
hugely flawed (see Chapter 6.1 for the summary of the unreasonable conclusions
reached by metempsychotic translation). To stand against the mainstream is
undoubtedly a difficult task, but our roles as academics deny us the luxury of
neglecting the facts to stay in the comfort zone when we know that the centre is
wrong. For scholars, hiding one’s head in the sand like an ostrich is a dangerous and
idle response to uncomfortable observations. Here, instead of suggesting that
translating through the incorporation of critical and psychoanalytical theories must
be the “right” or the best way to translate, I am attempting to highlight the necessity
to experiment and explore, to discover new methods and new ideas, when what we
have at hand in the centre is full of mistakes and inconsistence. This is the only way
for us to improve and make progress.
When it comes to the criticism that the Chinese versions I have offered of the
first three sentences of the Sappho section in Art and Lies do not constitute a
translatum as I have “deviated” too much in my psychoanalytical translation of
Winterson, I would like to emphasize the linkage between the source text and the
target text through the utilization of homophones—if my translation is not a
translation, there was no need for me to keep the meaning of “end-stop”, “universe”
or “in flagrante delicto” in my Chinese translation. And second, I would also like to
prompt my readers into the thinking activity of the nature of “translation”—what is
the definition of “translation”? If you think that my translation is not a translation,
regardless of the obvious relation between the source text and the target text, then
what is a translation? A piece which is highly equivalent to the target text? A piece in
which “deviation” only exists in obligatory shifts? If you believe that a translator
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should translate a text as closely as possible to the source text, you are then spoken
by the Author and, as explained in this dissertation, meanings and interpretations
depend relatively more on readers than writers. Why would you still want to restrict
translation or reading to the author’s meanings, when (1) we may never know the
author’s exact meanings in the first place, and (2) different readers can read different
meanings from the same piece of text? If two readers interpret the theme of a text in
a contrasting way, which one is the meaning of the text? Depending on the writer?
But can’t the writer lie about his/her intention, or can’t s/he simply not notice all the
possible interpretations of the texts? The Pixar team said the cartoon Wall-E does not
carry any messages of environmental protection but is only a romantic love story of
two robots—do you believe that? Does it mean that we cannot read anything more
than a love story in this film? Barthes criticized the hegemony of the Author in the
1970s—why would we want to go back to the time before that? Isn’t it progress that
we all want?
Real progress and development can only be made through the endless
challenging and overthrowing of the centre, especially when we see the
inconsistency and incompleteness of the mainstream. Many people follow the
dominant beliefs because they are not intelligent or blessed enough to understand or
be exposed to alternative ways of thinking, but as for academics, our task should be
to constantly push the periphery to the centre in order to achieve authentic progress
and approach the truth.
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